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ARTICLES

DAM REMOVAL IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST:
LESSONS FOR THE NATION
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* AND ANDREW B. ERICKSON**

Over the past dozen years, a number of large dams in the Pacific
Northwest have been removed in an effort to restore riverine
ecosystems and dependent species like salmon. These dam removals
provide perhaps the best example of large-scale environmental
remediation in the twenty-first century. This restoration, however, has
occurred on a case-by-case basis, without a comprehensive plan. The
result has been to put into motion ongoing rehabilitation efforts in four
distinct river basins: the Elwha and White Salmon in Washington and
the Sandy and Rogue in Oregon. In all, nine significant dams have been
removed, and four more—in the contentious Klamath Basin of Oregon
and California—are slated for removal within the next decade. This
Article surveys both the successful and proposed removals in order to
draw lessons both within and beyond the Pacific Northwest. We
identify a number of factors that determine both the speed and success
of dam removal efforts, including the availability of the federal
licensing process under the Federal Power Act, the existence and
organization of local opposition, the amount and sources of funding,
and the support of federal and state resource agencies and wellpositioned members of Congress. These factors suggest that the
promised removal of the Klamath dams—as well as calls for removing
four federal dams on the Lower Snake—face significant odds.

* Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School.
** J.D. expected 2013, Lewis & Clark Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Pacific Northwest stands at the forefront of a new era in dam
removal and river restoration. For over twenty years, the government has
studied, and river advocates have championed, a policy of breaching dams
that block salmon passage to spawning streams in Washington, Oregon, and
California.1 Recently removed dams and several scheduled removals indicate
that long-fought efforts to remove certain dams and restore their rivers are
bearing fruit.2
For most of the twentieth century, dam construction dominated the
rivers of the Pacific Northwest.3 Throughout the region’s major river basins,
dams produced hydropower, irrigation, flood control, and opportunities for
recreation.4 Yet the benefits of the dams came at high environmental costs.5
Salmon and other anadromous fish that return from the ocean to spawn in
freshwater streams encounter dams that often prevent their passage.6 The
high mortality rates caused by dams led to the listing of a number of salmon
species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).7 Inadequate fish ladders,

1 See OFFICE OF HYDROPOWER LICENSING, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: GLINES CANYON AND ELWHA HYDROELECTRIC PROJECTS,
WASHINGTON 2-16 to -17 (1991), available at http://ia700507.us.archive.org/29/items/
draftenvironment00fede/draftenvironment00fede.pdf [hereinafter GLINES AND ELWHA DRAFT EIS];
Michael T. Pyle, Note, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring America’s
Rivers, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 98–99 (1995) (discussing Congress’s decision to remove two dams
on the Elwha River in Washington and predicting increased future dam removal).
2 See Editorial, Rethinking Dams, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at A16 (discussing the Edwards
Dam removal in 1999); Matthew Preusch, Rogue River Near Reversal of Fortune, OREGONIAN,
June 8, 2008, at B1 (describing removal of the Elk Creek and Chiloquin Dams in 2008); Scott
Learn, With a Boom and a Flash of Light, Condit Dam is Breached and White Salmon River
Unleashed, OREGONIAN, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf
/2011/10/with_a_boom_and_a_flash_of_lig.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (discussing the
Condit Dam removal in 2011); Lynda V. Mapes, Elwha Dams’ Historic Removal Begins, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016222879_dams16m.html
(examining the removal of the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams in 2011 and 2012) (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012).
3 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem
Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 653, 657 (1997) (discussing the
Northwest’s era of dam building beginning in the 1930s and the subsequent ecosystem
transformations).
4 See Larry Hittle et al., Pacific Northwest Power Generation, Multi-Purpose Use of the
Columbia River, and Regional Energy Legislation: An Overview, 10 ENVTL. L. 235, 238–39 (1979).
5 See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon Simultaneously: The

Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River Dams, Lowering
John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1006–07 (1998).
6 F. Lorraine Bodi, Protecting Columbia River Salmon Under the Endangered Species Act,
10 ENVTL. L. 349, 369 (1980). The fish blocked include not only salmon, but also steelhead,
which are technically trout, but which share anadromous characteristics with salmon. Michael
C. Blumm et al., Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon
Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL. L. 709, 711 n.1 (2006).
7 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); e.g.,
Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the
Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519, 522–23 (1999); John M. Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha,
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changed hydraulic conditions, and the difficulties of downstream fish
passage around the dams led many to claim that saving and replenishing
salmon resources depended on removing barriers to free-flowing rivers and
restoring the rivers’ natural hydrology.8
Serious public attention turned to the prospect of removing dams in the
1990s.9 In 1992, Congress authorized the federal purchase of the Elwha and
Glines Canyon Dams in Washington State for $29.5 million.10 The Elwha Act
directed the Department of the Interior to study and implement complete
restoration of the Elwha River ecosystem, including the removal of the two
dams.11 Two years later, in 1994, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) issued a policy statement interpreting section 3 of the Electric
Consumers Protection Act12—which requires FERC to give equal
consideration to environmental and economic factors when licensing
dams13—concluding that the agency could order removal of dams at the dam
owner’s expense.14 Inherent in FERC’s dam removal policy was the
recognition that in some cases the balance of environmental and economic
considerations tipped in favor of removing dams.15 FERC used this power for
the first time in 1997 when it ordered the removal of the Edwards Dam in
Maine.16 Consequently, in 1999, for the first time in 160 years, the Kennebec
River flowed unimpeded to the ocean, allowing the free passage of fish from
the Atlantic to spawn upstream in headwaters tributaries.17
The success of the Edwards Dam removal led to increased interest in
dam removal and an accelerating number of proposals for river restoration

Essay, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, The Endangered Species Act, and
Adaptive Management, 23 ENVTL. L. 1249, 1250 (1993).
8 See Blumm et al., supra note 5, at 1051–54; Rollie Wilson, Removing Dam Development to
Recover Columbia Basin Treaty Protected Salmon Economies, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 357, 393–
94, 396–98, 417–19 (2000) (examining the detrimental effects of dams on salmon habitat and
calling for dam removal to restore necessary water flows). See generally STEVEN HAWLEY,
RECOVERING A LOST RIVER: REMOVING DAMS, REWILDING SALMON, REVITALIZING COMMUNITIES
(2011) (arguing for dam removal on the Snake River and discussing the dam removal trend in
the Pacific Northwest).
9 See Pyle, supra note 1, at 98–99 (discussing Congress’s decision to remove dams on
Washington’s Elwha River, a subsequent FERC policy statement indicating further dam removal
in the future, and also noting the increased public support in favor of dam removal).
10 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, § 3(b), 106
Stat. 3173, 3174 (1992).
11 Id. §§ 3, 4, 106 Stat. at 3174–76.
12 Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
13 Project Decommissioning at Relicensing; Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 339, 339–40 (Jan.
4, 1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R § 2.24).
14 Id. at 340.
15 See Peter J. Carney, Dam Removal: Evolving Federal Policy Opens a New Avenue of
Fisheries and Ecosystem Management, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 309, 316–17 (2000); Blumm et
al., supra note 5, at 1052 (concluding that economic benefits of dam removal sometimes
outweigh economic benefits of leaving dams in place).
16 See Carney, supra note 15, at 324–25.
17

Id.
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in the Pacific Northwest.18 But removing dams and restoring rivers is quite
complex. Aside from the physical practicalities of engineering safe dam
breaches19 and restoring ecosystems,20 legal and political factors affect the
speed and success of removal efforts. Some dam removal projects have
proceeded relatively quickly from proposal to completion.21 Other projects
experience conflict, political wrangling, and serious delay.22 This paper
examines the factors that affect the outcome of dam removal proposals,
including the size of the removal, the FERC relicensing process, local
opposition, political support, and funding.
We examine several dam removals and proposed removals in the
Pacific Northwest in order to analyze the factors that contribute to
successful and speedy dam removal. Part II of this Article begins by
investigating the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams on the Elwha River near
Olympic National Park in western Washington. The federal government
purchased both dams in 2000 and began the removal process in the fall of
2011.23 The government aims to restore the natural ecosystem near the
national park over the next thirty years.24
18 Scott Learn, Hydropower Dam Removal Ramps Up in the Northwest This Fall, July 25,
2011,
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/07/hydropower_dam_removal_
ramps_u.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). In 2009, old dams were being removed at a rate of 40
per year. Matthew Preusch, Dams go Down, Uncorking Rivers for Kayakers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2009, at TR3. Between 2000 and 2010, 410 dams were removed across the country, mostly in the
East and Midwest. Go With the Flow: Removing Old Dams Benefits America’s Rivers
Economically and Ecologically, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1–7, 2011, at 35. There are approximately
84,000 operational dams in the United States. See id.
19 See N. Leroy Poff & David D. Hart, How Dams Vary and Why it Matters for the Emerging
Science of Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 659, 665–66 (2002).
20 See Angela T. Bednarek, Undamming Rivers: A Review of the Ecological Impacts of Dam
Removal, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 803 (2001).
21 See David H. Becker, The Challenges of Dam Removal: The History and Lessons of the
Condit Dam and Potential Threats from the 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments, 36 ENVTL. L.
811, 832 n.135 (2006). The Gold Hill and Gold Ray dams were removed within a few years of the
initial proposal. See infra Part V. Portland General Electric removed the Little Sandy and
Marmot Dams near Mt. Hood eight and nine years after the initial proposal, respectively. See
infra Part IV.
22 See Philip M. Bender, Restoring the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers: A
Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the Pacific Northwest, 17 J. LAND RES. & ENVTL. L.
189, 219–30 (1997) (discussing conflicts associated with removal of Elwha and Glines Canyon
Dams). Removing the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams was proposed for over a quarter-century,
beginning in 1984. Removal finally began in 2011 and will continue until the end of 2012. See
infra Part II.B. Discussions of removing dams in the Klamath have been ongoing for over a
decade, with dam removal not expected to begin until at least 2020. See infra Part VI.B; Dow A.
Davidson, Comment, Who Wants Some Water: The Ongoing Battle for the Klamath River Basin
and the Need for Moderate Institutional Change to End the War, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 531 (2004)
(discussing the conflicts over water rights in the Klamath River Basin). It took 12 years to
remove the Condit Dam after a settlement calling for dam removal. See infra Part III.
23 See Lynda V. Mapes, Dams’ Removal Promises Unique Chance to Start Over on a Grand
Scale, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016083904_
elwhaoverview18m.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012); Bureau of Reclamation, Elwha and Glines
Canyon Dams, Elwha River near Port Angeles, Washington, http://www.usbr.gov/pmts/
sediment/projects/ElwhaRiver/ElwhaGlinesCanyon.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
24 See infra Part II.C.
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Part III addresses the removal of the Condit Dam on the White Salmon
River in southern Washington. The Condit removal was a result of a 1999
settlement between the Yakama Nation and other tribes, the dam’s owneroperator PacifiCorp, federal agencies, and environmental groups, regarding
salmon access to traditional fishing areas upstream. PacifiCorp faced the
choice of implementing expensive modifications to allow fish passage at the
Condit or agreeing to pay for a complete removal. In October 2011, a dozen
years after the settlement, PacifiCorp removed the dam and in 2012 began
remediation activities, including the removal of the dam remnants.25
Part IV turns to the removals of the Marmot and Sandy Dams near Mt.
Hood outside of Portland, Oregon. These two small-scale hydroelectric
dams—owned and operated by Portland General Electric (PGE)—required
extensive repairs and upgrades in order to modernize fish passage facilities
and comply with fish passage prescriptions under the Federal Power Act
(FPA).26 PGE opted for removal rather than paying for the expensive repairs,
and removed the dams without much fanfare in 2007 and 2008, respectively.27
Part V examines the Rogue River watershed in southern Oregon. The
Rogue Basin once featured eight major dams that provided irrigation water
and flood control. But between 2008 and 2010, local governments removed
three of the dams—the Gold Hill, Savage Rapids, and Gold Ray Dams—and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers notched a fourth—the Elk Creek Dam.
At the time of removal, none of the dams provided hydroelectric power,
and the extensive maintenance costs and new irrigation options
contributed to the various decisions to remove the aging dams and not
complete the Elk Creek Dam.28
Part VI proceeds to consider proposals for dam removal in the Klamath
River Basin in southern Oregon and northern California. The Klamath Basin
now has seven major dams, all owned by PacifiCorp, all but one of which
provide significant sources of hydroelectric power.29 In 2010, two major
settlements in the Klamath Basin established a goal of removing four of
these dams on the mainstem of the Klamath River by 2020.30 The Klamath
restoration would be the largest dam removal project in history, but
resolving the contentious issues of funding for removal and allocating water
rights remain significant hurdles before beginning the restoration.
The Article concludes by assessing the prospects for future dam
removals and investigating how lessons from the Pacific Northwest can be

25 See Shannon Dininny, Crews Breach Condit Dam in Washington, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26,
2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2016617309_apwadamremoval7thldwritethru.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
26 See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2006); Portland General Electric, Protecting Fish:
Sandy River, www.portlandgeneral.com/community_environment/initiatives/protecting_fish/
sandy_river/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
27 See infra Part IV.B.2.
28 See Preusch, supra note 2.
29 See PacifiCorp, Klamath River: Project Overview, http://www.pacificorp.com/es/hydro/hl/
kr.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
30 See infra Part VI.B.
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applied to other regions.31 The experiences of dam removal in the Pacific
Northwest—including restoration projects as monumental as the dams they
will replace—provide useful examples for other regions struggling to break
down the complex legal, political, and concrete barriers to restoring freeflowing rivers.
II. THE ELWHA RIVER: REMOVAL OF THE ELWHA AND GLINES CANYON DAMS
The Elwha River’s headwaters are in the Bailey Range of the Olympic
Mountains in western Washington. The river flows north to the Strait of Juan
de Fuca, halfway between the Pacific Ocean and Puget Sound.32 Glaciers that
once covered the Olympic Peninsula during the Pleistocene shaped the
hydrology of the Elwha watershed, creating a rapid river that descends 4,500
feet in just forty-five miles.33 Before construction of the dams, the Elwha
River supported a highly productive fishery, regarded as one of the most
prolific in the Pacific Northwest.34 The Elwha watershed provided spawning
habitat for every species of anadromous fish native to the Pacific
Northwest,35 including massive Elwha River chinook salmon that often
weighed more than a hundred pounds.36 For over 2,700 years, the Elwha
River’s fisheries had helped sustain the survival and livelihoods of the native
inhabitants of the area.37

A. Damming the Elwha River
The growth of non-native settlement on the Olympic Peninsula near the
end of the nineteenth century led to drastic changes in the human economy
of the region as well the Elwha River ecosystem. Since 1914, the Elwha and
31

See infra Part VII.
See Jeffrey J. Duda et al., Baseline Studies in the Elwha River Ecosystem Prior to Dam
Removal: Introduction to the Special Issue, 82 NW. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 4 (2008); Russell W.
Busch, Tribal Advocacy for Elwha River Dams Removal on Washington’s Olympic Peninsula, 2
32

GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 5 (2008).
33 See ROWLAND W. TABOR, GUIDE TO THE GEOLOGY OF OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK 85–86, 92–93,
95 (1975). The Elwha River is a glacial-fed stream from the glaciers in the Olympic Mountains.
See Duda et al., supra note 32, at 3–5; Tearing Down the Elwha River Dam, POPULAR MECHANICS,
Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/environment/water/2294301 (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012).
34 Robert C. Wunderlich et al., Restoration of the Elwha River Ecosystem, FISHERIES, Aug.
1994, at 11–12.
35 Anadromous fish native to the Northwest include spring-and summer-fall-run chinook
(Oncorhynchus tsawytscha), coho (O. kisutch), chum (O. keta), pink (O. gorbuscha), and
sockeye salmon (O. nerka); and summer- and winter-run steelhead (O. mykiss), sea-run
cutthroat trout (O. clarki), Dolly Varden or sea-run native char (Salvelinus malma), and bull
trout (S. confluentus)). Id. at 12–13.
36 See BRUCE BROWN, MOUNTAIN IN THE CLOUDS: A SEARCH FOR THE WILD SALMON 63 (1982);
Michael L. Goodman, Comment, Preserving the Genetic Diversity of Salmonid Stocks: A Call for
Federal Regulation of Hatchery Programs, 20 ENVTL. L. 111, 120 (1990).
37 The Elwha River’s human history begins with the first inhabitants, the Lower Elwha
Klallam Tribe. See LYNDA V. MAPES, BREAKING GROUND: THE LOWER ELWHA KLALLAM TRIBE AND
THE UNEARTHING OF TSE-WHIT-ZEN VILLAGE 25–26 (2009).
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Glines Canyon Dams produced hydroelectric power that facilitated the
growth in cities and industries throughout the peninsula. Yet almost
immediately after the dams’ construction, the river’s salmon fishery virtually
disappeared, and the ecology of the Elwha River entered a steep and longterm decline.

1. Construction of the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams
In 1910, the Olympic Power and Development Company began
construction of a hydroelectric dam in the Elwha Gorge, five miles upstream
from the river’s mouth.38 Engineers built an eighty-foot concrete gravity dam
across the river by anchoring each side of the dam to the canyon walls,
suspending the retaining wall down to the riverbed.39 After the first design
failed and flooded downstream communities, the reconstructed Elwha Dam
was completed in 1913, standing 105-feet tall and creating a 267-acre
reservoir, Lake Aldwell.40
The success of lumber mills and the growing economy of the peninsula
led to increased demand for electricity and more hydroelectric
development.41 In 1925, construction of a second dam began about eight
miles upstream from the Elwha in Glines Canyon.42 Workers completed
Glines Canyon Dam, a 210-foot concrete arch dam, in 1927, creating a new
reservoir on the Elwha River: Lake Mills.43 Hydroelectric power generated at
the Glines Canyon Dam and a significant water diversion, totaling more than
150 cubic feet per second from the Elwha River, supplied lumber mills in
Port Angeles, Washington.44 Unlike the Elwha Dam, which was constructed
before enactment of the 1920 Federal Power Act, the Glines Canyon Dam
received a fifty-year permit from the Federal Power Commission in 1926 for
hydropower production.45
Together, the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams generated a significant
amount of electricity for the Olympic Peninsula.46 The dams produced over
28 megawatts (MW) of electricity and supplied power to lumber mills in Port

38 Nat’l
Park Serv., Dam Construction: History of the Dam Construction,
www.nps.gov/olym/historyculture/dam-construction.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012); BROWN,
supra note 36, at 69.
39 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 38.
40 Id.; Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 23; Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, History of
Hydropower on the Elwha River, http://www.npca.org/protecting-our-parks/air-landwater/great-waters/elwha-dam-history.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
41 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 38.
42 See ELIZABETH GROSSMAN, WATERSHED: THE UNDAMMING OF AMERICA 159 (2002). The
Elwha Dam was built at river mile 4.9 and the Glines Canyon Dam at river mile 13.5. Id. at
158–59.
43 See Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 23; GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 159.
44 See BROWN, supra note 36, at 94.
45 See GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 160.
46 Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, supra note 40.
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Angeles and cities up to sixty miles away.47 Over their 100-year history, the
dams changed ownership multiple times, reflecting their profitability and
their importance as reliable sources of electricity to the industries in
the region.48
Although the construction and operation of the dams garnered
widespread public support, concerns about the effects on the Elwha’s
salmon fishery arose in the first years of construction.49 The Elwha and
Glines Canyon Dams were both built without fish passage facilities,
in violation of Washington state law,50 and early attempts at restocking the
river with hatchery fish failed.51 Since the closure of the original fish
hatchery in 1922, the Elwha River’s dams have operated without fish ladders,
other fish passage devices, or even a hatchery.52 Not until 1975 did the dam
owners enter into a mitigation agreement with the Washington Department
of Fish and Wildlife to fund a salmon rearing channel downstream from the
Elwha Dam and to regulate river flows to facilitate salmon spawning in the
lower river.53

2. The Decline of the Elwha River Ecosystem
The Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams completely blocked fish passage to
crucial spawning habitat in the upper forty miles of the Elwha River and
significantly altered the glacial-fed river’s hydromorphology.54 Almost
immediately after the completion of the Elwha Dam, the river’s salmon
population dropped by 75%.55 None of the nine species of anadromous fish
that spawned in the upstream portions of the river and its headwaters
managed to spawn in years after 1910,56 and all but one species of salmon—

47 Elwha Watershed Info. Res., History of Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams, http://www.
elwhainfo.org/elwha-river-watershed/dam-removal/history-elwha-and-glines-canyon-dams (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012).
48 See GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 161.
49 See GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 158.
50 Act of Feb 11, 1890, § 8, 1889–1890 Wash. Sess. Laws 106, 107–08 (requiring fish passage
facilities whenever an obstruction was placed in a river where “food fish are wont to ascend”).
See BROWN, supra note 36, at 71; Busch, supra note 32, at 12.
51 See BROWN, supra note 36, at 71–72.
52 See id. The Lower Klallam Tribe operates a fish hatchery in coordination with the
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife on the lower Elwha River. See Elwha Watershed
Info. Res., supra note 47.
53 Agreement Between Crown Zellerbach Corporation and Washington State Department of
Fisheries, Covering Contribution Toward Cost of Construction and Operation of Salmon
Rearing Pond and Appurtenant Facilities on Elwha River, Apr. 25, 1975, available at
http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/habitat/planning/energy/mitigation/region6/ElwhaDams.pdf.
See BROWN, supra note 36, at 108.
54 See BROWN, supra note 36, at 72. The Elwha Dam blocked fish passage to 93% of fish
spawning habitat in the watershed. Lynda V. Mapes, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe Celebrates,
Works to Help River Recover, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/
html/localnews/2016084054_elwhatribe18m.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
55 See BROWN, supra note 36, at 72.
56 Wunderlich et al., supra note 34, at 11.
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the fall chinook—were virtually eliminated from the Elwha ecosystem.57
Even populations of fall chinook, which spawned in the lower stretches
of the river below the dams, were significantly reduced due to changing
river habitat.58
Although the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams wreaked havoc on the
downstream ecosystem, the upper reaches of the Elwha River remained in
near-pristine condition.59 In 1938, Congress created Olympic National Park,
preserving nearly forty miles of the Elwha River, including Lake Mills up to
the foundation of the Glines Canyon Dam.60 After 1938, the Glines Canyon
Dam continued to operate on the border of the national park in a special
use zone, allowing the dam to generate electricity despite the park’s
preservation goals.61

B. FERC Relicensing, Political Compromise, and Dam Removal Efforts
The loss of wild anadromous fish and the adverse ecological effects on
the Elwha River led to sustained efforts aimed at removing the dams and
restoring the river’s ecosystem. In 1937, the first proposal to require dam
removal and river restoration on the Elwha River failed in the Washington
state legislature.62 Fifty years later, a challenge to the relicensing of the
Glines Canyon Dam evolved into a broad political effort to force the removal
of the dams.63 Nearly a century after construction of the Elwha Dam, the
removal of the dams is ongoing as of this writing; wild salmon are expected
to return to the headwaters within a few years.64

57

See BROWN, supra note 36, at 72; Wunderlich et al., supra note 34, at 13.
See NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: ELWHA RIVER ECOSYSTEM
RESTORATION 18, 26 (1995) [hereinafter ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS], available at
58

http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=136255.
59 See American Rivers, Elwha River Restoration: Background and History, http://
www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/dams/projects/elwha-river-background.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012).
60 See Robert W. Righter, National Monuments to National Parks: The Use of the Antiquities
Act of 1906, 20 W. HIST. Q. 281, 291–92 (1989); Nat’l Park Serv., The Elwha Watershed,
http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/the-elwha-watershed.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012)
(noting that 83% of Elwha’s 70-mile watershed is “located within Olympic National Park,
sheltering it and making it a particularly pristine river habitat”).
61 Glines Canyon Dam is located on a private property inholding within the boundaries of
the park. See Charles Gowan et al., The Role of Ecosystem Valuation in Environmental Decision
Making: Hydropower Relicensing and Dam Removal on the Elwha River, 56 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
508, 510 (2006) (noting that in 1938, “Congress established Olympic National Park (ONP) on
lands surrounding the Glines project”); see also ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58,
at 18.
62 State Representative Francis Perkins introduced legislation in 1937 that would have
required dam removal and restoration of the Elwha River. The legislation failed after the
Washington Director of Fisheries declined to support the proposal. See BROWN, supra note 36,
at 94.
63 See Bender, supra note 22, at 223–29.
64 See ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58, at 116; see also Lynda V. Mapes, Big
Kings Return to Reign in Elwha, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/
html/localnews/2016257709_chinook20m.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
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1. Relicensing the Dams
The ultimately successful campaign to remove the dams began in the
1970s as a challenge to the relicensing of the Glines Canyon Dam.65 In 1973,
the dam owners, whose fifty-year license would expire in 1976,66 submitted
an application to FERC to relicense the dam.67 The application created a
controversy over whether FERC possessed the authority to license the dam,
now located on the border of Olympic National Park.68 Opponents claimed
that the relicensing conflicted with the park’s preservation goals, especially
because the reservoir, Lake Mills, flooded portions of the park.69 Without
a FERC license to operate, opponents claimed that the dam would have to
be removed.70
In 1978, the Elwha Dam failed a federal safety inspection, causing alarm
for downstream landowners and sparking increased interest in dam
removal.71 Out of concern for its reservation property downstream and the
loss of traditional fisheries, the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe became the first
major advocate for complete dam removal and restoration.72 In 1986, the
tribe intervened in the licensing proceedings before FERC, requesting denial
of the application and removal of the dams.73 In the years after 1986,
environmental organizations,74 the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and the National Park Service
(NPS) joined the tribe in opposition to the dams’ relicensing.75
In response to this opposition, FERC took the position that it possessed
the authority under the Federal Power Act to relicense the Glines Canyon
Dam.76 Although Lake Mills was located within Olympic National Park, the
65
66
67

See GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 161.
See Id. at 160–161.
GLINES AND ELWHA DRAFT EIS, supra note 1, at 2-1. At the time of the relicensing

application, the James River Corporation owned both the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams. The
previous owner, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, had owned the Elwha Dam since 1919 and built
the Glines Canyon Dam in 1926 before becoming James River Corporation. See BROWN, supra
note 36, at 94; ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58, at 15.
68 See Bender, supra note 22, at 224–25.
69 James River II, Inc., Project Nos. 588-004, 2683-006, 53 FERC ¶ 61,096, 61,267 (Oct. 19,
1990) (vacating prior FERC order, 69 FERC ¶ 61,045, and citing 9th Circuit case law).
70 See Busch, supra note 32, at 17.
71 BROWN, supra note 36, at 107.
72 See Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe, Dam Removal: History of Elwha Dam,
http://www.elwha.org/damremoval.html (click on the “Effect On the People” and “Dam
Timeline” hyperlinks at the top of the page) (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (providing a narrative of
the Klallam Tribe’s long opposition to the Elwha Dam); Busch, supra note 32, at 17. The Klallam
Tribe was concerned about traditional fisheries because they had retained fishing rights on the
Elwha River through the Point No Point Treaty. See Act of Jan. 26, 1885, 12 Stat. 933, available
at http://www.fws.gov/pacific/ea/tribal/treaties/skallam.pdf.
73 See Gowan et al., supra note 61, at 512.
74 Olympic Park Associates, Friends of the Earth, Seattle Audubon Society, and the Sierra
Club. See Re James River II, Inc., Project Nos. 588-005, 2683-007, 55 FERC ¶ 61,034, 61,088 (Apr.
5, 1991) (denying requests for rehearing and reconsideration).
75 See Busch, supra note 32, at 9.
76 James River II, Inc., Project Nos. 588-004, 2683-006, 53 FERC ¶ 61,096, 61,270 (Oct. 19,
1990) (vacating prior FERC order, 69 FERC ¶ 61,045.
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dam and the land underneath the dam were located on private land;77
therefore, FERC claimed it could grant the license to generate hydropower.78
In a 1990 decision, FERC concluded that the agency had jurisdiction to
relicense the dams and dismissed the intervenors’ claims.79 The tribe,
environmental organizations, FWS, and NMFS appealed FERC’s
jurisdictional ruling to the Ninth Circuit.80
While litigation over FERC jurisdiction was working its way through the
courts, support grew for the efforts to remove the dams.81 Politicians from
Washington State and across the country began to take notice of the
controversy.82 In a move that signaled his support for dam removal,
Representative John Dingell of Michigan requested a General Accounting
Office (GAO) study of whether FERC had jurisdiction to relicense the
dams.83 In 1991, FERC released a draft environmental impact statement
(EIS) that concluded dam removal was feasible and could restore the Elwha
River’s fisheries.84 The feasibility of dam removal, combined with the
potential for a lengthy legal quagmire over the question of federal
jurisdiction, eventually led to a compromise between the environmental
interests advocating for dam removal and the dam owners and electricity
customers arguing for relicensing.85

2. Political Compromise and Funding for Removal
The political compromise that resulted in the federal purchase and
removal of the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams was a product of
Congressman Dingell and multiple stakeholders’ efforts to end the legal
stalemate over FERC jurisdiction.86 Key stakeholders in the process were the
advocates for dam removal and restoration, including environmental
organizations, the tribe, FWS, NMFS, and the NPS.87 Dam removal advocates
hoped for the complete removal of the dams in order to restore the degraded
Elwha River, producing a naturally flowing river with native fish
populations.
The Elwha region’s community, including the city of Port Angeles,
Washington, ended up in the middle of the political fight. Testimony before
77
78
79
80
81

Id. ¶ 61,263.
Id. ¶ 61,269.
Id. ¶ 61,271.
Busch, supra note 32, at 18.
See Bender, supra note 22, at 225–26 (noting that “every federal agency involved supports

dam removal”).
82 See WILLIAM R. LOWRY, DAM POLITICS: RESTORING AMERICA’S RIVERS 141 (2003).
83 The GAO, now the Government Accountability Office, concluded that FERC lacked
jurisdiction to license a hydroelectric dam located within the borders of a national park. See
JEFF CRANE, FINDING THE RIVER: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE ELWHA 152 (2011).
84 GLINES AND ELWHA DRAFT EIS, supra note 1.
85 See Busch, supra note 32, at 19.
86 Id. (discussing the political compromise that resulted in the federal purchase and removal
of the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams); see CRANE, supra note 83, at 147–49 (discussing the
pivotal efforts of Congressman Dingell in effectuating the compromise).
87 Id. at 9.
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the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources revealed the
community’s fears that major changes in the area would affect its economic
stability, the city’s water supply, and its general way of life.88 In response to
political negotiations over the future of the dams, Port Angeles formed the
Elwha Citizens Advisory Committee, which eventually reached a consensus
in support of dam removal.89
On the other side of the controversy, the dam owners, James River
Corporation, and power consumers, like Daishowa American Paper Mill,
opposed dam removal.90 In the early 1990s, the Daishowa American mill
operated one of the largest mills in Port Angeles,91 relying on hydroelectric
power from the Elwha dams to supply between 34% and 42% of the mill’s
electricity.92 The mill received favorable rates from the dams and opposed dam
removal, which allegedly would jeopardize the mill’s economic viability.93
In 1992, advocates for dam removal reached a compromise with the
James River Corporation and the Daishowa mill.94 Both sides foresaw a
lengthy and costly legal battle over the future of dam relicensing and agreed
to a congressional compromise that promised favorable terms to both
sides.95 The ensuing 1992 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration
Act96 authorized the Department of the Interior to purchase the Elwha and
Glines Canyon Dams,97 directed Interior to study the feasibility for removal
and complete restoration of the ecosystem,98 and provided a guarantee that
the customers of Elwha hydroelectricity would receive power from other
electricity providers at fair market rates.99 The Elwha Act thus ended the
conflict of FERC jurisdiction over relicensing by granting the dams

88 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2527 Before the S.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 102nd Cong. 120 (1992) (statement of James D. Hallett,

Mayor, Port Angeles, Washington).
89 The advisory committee determined that the benefits of restoring salmon populations
outweighed other concerns, such as property values and removal costs. See Harry Lydiard, A
Remarkable Grassroots Effort: The Work of the Elwha Citizens’ Advisory Committee, OLYMPIC
PARK ASSOCS. NEWSL., June 1996, http://www.drizzle.com/~rdpayne/opa-news-v4n1.html (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012).
90 See Bender, supra note 22, at 226.
91 See Hearing on S. 2527, supra note 88, at 111 (statement of Steve Taniguchi, Executive
Vice President, Diashowa America Co.) (testifying that “Diashowa America is the second largest
employer in Clallam County”); see also BROWN, supra note 36, at 72 (noting that the mill, then
owned by Crown Zellerbach, used the power generated by the dam to run the first of the large
lumber mills located in Port Angeles).
92 Hearing on S. 2527, supra note 88, at 117.
93 See Gowan et al., supra note 61, at 510 (stating that the primary benefit of the dams
was their ability to provide electricity at less than half the rates charged by competitor
electricity providers).
94 See Bender, supra note 22, at 226–27.
95 See Busch, supra note 32, at 18.
96 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, 106 Stat. 3173
(1992) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(2), 797a, 797c (2006)).
97 Id. § 3(a).
98 Id. §§ 3(c), 4.
99 Id. § 5(b).
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permission to operate temporarily until the federal government appropriated
funds to purchase the dams.100
Although the Elwha Act settled the conflict over the future of the dams,
the appropriation of federal funds for the purchase and deconstruction of
the dams created a new political controversy.101 The Act authorized the
Department of the Interior to purchase and remove the dams but left the
appropriation of funds to future acts of Congress.102 Initially, the Elwha Act
received broad political support, from both Democrats and Republicans.103
But in the years following the 1994 congressional elections, the political
atmosphere changed.104 An original supporter of the Elwha Act, Senator
Slade Gorton (R-WA) withdrew his support for appropriations and later
conditioned federal funding for the removal of the Elwha dams on
guarantees that the federal government would not breach dams on the Snake
River.105 Senator Gorton proceeded to prevent passage of numerous
appropriations bills in the Senate from 1992 to 2000, but in 2000 he
eventually lost a reelection bid to Democrat Maria Cantwell.106 In 1998,
Congress appropriated $29.5 million for the Department of the Interior to
buy both dams.107
Appropriations for the deconstruction of the dams occurred in stages
from 2000 to 2010.108 Champions of dam removal in Congress, including
Representative Norman Dicks of northwest Washington, secured about $20
million per year in funding for the removal.109 By 2004, funding for the Elwha
restoration totaled $126.7 million, roughly half of the initial estimated

100 See Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(2), 797a,
797c (2006).
101 See Busch, supra note 32, at 20.
102 Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 102-495, § 9, 106 Stat.
3173 (1992).
103 See LOWRY, supra note 82, at 146.
104 See generally Gary C. Jacobson, The 1994 House Elections in Perspective, 111 POL. SCI. Q.
203 (1996) (describing the electoral victory of Republicans in 1994, which resulted in a new
majority in the House of Representatives).
105 See LOWRY, supra note 82, at 146–47; Bender, supra note 22, at 228.
106 See LOWRY, supra note 82, at 149. The lack of funding for the Elwha restoration
throughout the 1990s became known as the “lost decade.” Adam Burke, River of Dreams, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, at 11.
107 ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58, at 186. The final purchase occurred in
February 2000. See Burke, supra note 106. The federal government paid $29.5 million for both
dams. John Kendall, The Elwha Dams, Part 3—Fisheries, Dams Linked in 1980s, PENINSULA
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 13, 2011, http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/20110913/NEWS/
309139992/0/SEARCH (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
108 See Kim Todd, Rebuilding a River as Washington’s Elwha Dams Come Down, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 19, 2011, at 18. Former Senator Bill Bradley stressed that the effort to
remove the Elwha Dams resulted from a truly bipartisan effort in Congress, and was supported
by Democrats and Republicans in Washington, D.C. and Washington State. See Senator Bill
Bradley, Former U.S. Senator from N.J., Keynote Address at a Dinner Hosted by the Lower
Elwha Klallam Tribe (Sept. 16, 2011) (on file with authors).
109 See
Nat’l Park Serv., Contractor Selected for Elwha Dam Removal,
http://www.nps.gov/olym/contractor-selected-for-elwha-dam-removal.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2012); LOWRY, supra note 82, at 147–48.
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removal cost of $246 million to $272 million.110 Stimulus funding from the
2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act contributed an additional
$54 million.111 In April 2010, the National Park Service, which operated as
lead agency in managing the Elwha dam removals and restoration, awarded
the contract to conduct the removal of both dams, indicating that the total
appropriation for complete removal and restoration was in hand.112

3. The Removal
The three-year process of removing the dams began during the summer
of 2011. The first step involved the drawdown of both reservoirs, Lake Mills
and Lake Aldwell.113 On September 15, 2011, engineers began the removal of
the Glines Canyon Dam by “notching” a top section of the dam and allowing
the reservoir to drain out of the notched area.114 The 173-foot dam will be
notched in sections, creating temporary spillways and draining the reservoir
until the entire concrete structure is removed.115 On September 19, 2011,
removal of the Elwha Dam began with the creation of a diversion around the
dam.116 Engineers created cofferdams to channel water into the diversion so
that the concrete structure could be removed in pieces.117 When both dams
are completely removed in 2014, the stream channel will be restored to
resemble pre-dam conditions.118

C. Restoring the Elwha River
The removal of two 100-year-old dams presented serious concerns
about its positive and negative ecological effects to the Elwha ecosystem.119
During the dam removal, the NPS will attempt to minimize the short-term

110 ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58, at 96. Revisions to this early estimate
placed costs at around $325 million. Todd, supra note 108.
111 See Todd, supra note 108.
112 See Paul Gottlieb, Dam Removal Contract Comes in $13 Million Under Estimate,
PENINSULA DAILY NEWS, Aug. 27, 2010, http://www.peninsuladailynews.com/article/20100827/
NEWS/308279992/0 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
113 See Nat’l Park Serv., Dam Removal Strategies, http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/
dam-removal-overview.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
114

See id.
Id.
116 See id.
117 See id. For live video streams of the dam removal process, see Nat’l Park Serv., Elwha
River Webcams, http://www.nps.gov/olym/photosmultimedia/elwha-river-webcams.htm (last
115

visited Nov. 18, 2012). For photographs of the restoration process, see John Gussman,
ElwhaFilm.com, http://www.elwhafilm.com/finalswitch (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
118 See Dam Removal Strategies, supra note 113. In March 2012, engineers opened the upper
stretches of the Elwha River to salmon for the first time in almost a century. Excavators
removed enough of the Glines Canyon Dam to allow the river to flow through the remaining
structure. Observers hope to see chinook salmon returning to the upper reaches within months.
E-mail from Thomas C. Jensen, Partner, SNR Denton, to Michael C. Blumm (Mar. 17, 2012, 21:46
PDT) (on file with authors).
119 See ELWHA RIVER RESTORATION FEIS, supra note 58, at 4.
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environmental effects by removing both dams slowly and in sections.120
Project planners ruled out blasting the dams because of the potential for
damage caused by the immediate release of 24 million cubic yards of
sediment trapped behind the dams.121 The NPS concluded that a slow
removal, using natural hydrologic erosion to rebuild the river channel was
the best option for restoration.122
After three years of dam deconstruction and engineering new channels
on the footprints of the dams, scientists estimate that it will take about thirty
years for the Elwha River to return to its normal flows and sediment loads.123
In the long-term, scientists predict that the dam removals will have positive
effects on the hydromorphology,124 biology,125 and overall ecology of the
Elwha ecosystem.126 Ecologists expect anadromous fish to return to spawn
in upstream segments of the Elwha sometime in the next three years,
marking the first time in over 100 years that wild salmon will spawn in the
upper Elwha.127
III. THE WHITE SALMON RIVER: REMOVING THE CONDIT DAM
The White Salmon River flows south from its glacial headwaters on the
slopes of Mount Adams in south central Washington to its confluence with
the Columbia River on the Washington-Oregon border.128 The forty-five mile
long river cuts through canyons and confined valleys formed of basalt from
historic volcanic eruptions and carries high sediment loads resulting from

120

See Dam Removal Strategies, supra note 113.
See Mapes, supra note 23; Tom Banse, Elwha River Dam Removal Historic, But Not
Explosive, OR. PUB. BROAD., Aug. 23, 2011, http://news.opb.org/article/elwha_river_dam_
121

removal_historic_but_not_explosive (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
122 See Banse, supra note 121; Brian Clark Howard, Bulldozers Tear Into Big Washington
Dams, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/
2011/09/110923-elwha-dam-removal (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
123 See Tearing Down the Elwha River Dam, supra note 33; Howard, supra note 122.
124 See Ellen K. Mussman et al., Predicting Secondary Reservoir Sediment Erosion and
Stabilization Following Dam Removal, 82 NW. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 236, 244 (2008) (concluding
that erosion will restore the stream channel).
125 See Sarah A. Morley et al., Benthic Invertebrates and Periphyton in the Elwha River
Basin: Current Conditions and Predicted Response to Dam Removal, 82 NW. SCI. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
179, 193 (2008) (predicting increases in habitat diversity and benthic invertebrate biodiversity
after dam removal).
126 See Nat’l Park Serv., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nps.gov/olym/
naturescience/Elwha-faq.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
127 See Mapes, supra note 64. The Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe has voluntarily agreed to not
fish the river for five years following dam removal in order to promote recovery and
reestablishment of fish populations. See Nathan Rice, Fish Fight on the Elwha, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.hcn.org/hcn/blogs/goat/fish-fight-on-the-elwha (last visited Nov.
18, 2012); Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Elwha River, http://wdfw.wa.gov/fishing/washington/
477 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
128 See NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, DRAFT WHITE SALMON SUBBASIN SURVEY
1 fig.1 (2000).
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the erosion of deposits left by lahars,129 which were common throughout the
White Salmon watershed.130 Anadromous fish, including chinook, coho,
chum, steelhead, and sea-run cutthroat trout were once common in the
lower reaches of the river and tributaries, which provided pristine spawning
habitat and cold-water refuges for fish migrating up the Columbia River.131
Until the construction of the Condit Dam near the mouth of the White
Salmon blocked all but the lower three miles for anadromous fish passage,
the area’s first inhabitants, the Yakama Tribe, carried out a centuries-old
tradition of fishing and sustaining themselves on salmon caught near
Husum Falls.132

A. Condit Dam Construction
Population growth in the Columbia River Gorge at the beginning of the
1900s led to an increased demand for electricity to power the region’s chief
economic activity—paper mills.133 In 1911, the Crown Columbia paper mill of
Camas, Washington, one of the largest paper mills on the Pacific Coast,
formed the Northwestern Electric Company in order to build a hydroelectric
power facility to supply energy to the mill.134 The White Salmon’s exposed
rock canyon walls, steep gradient, and high potential energy provided an
ideal placement for a hydroelectric project.135 In 1912, engineers completely
diverted the river around the dam site 3.3 miles upstream from the river’s
mouth and used 30,000 cubic yards of concrete to construct the solid129 Lahars are volcanic debris transported by water. See JAMES W. VALLANCE, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BULLETIN NO. 2161, POSTGLACIAL LAHARS AND POTENTIAL HAZARDS IN THE
WHITE SALMON RIVER SYSTEM ON THE SOUTHWEST FLANK OF MOUNT ADAMS, WASHINGTON 5 (1999);
see also OFFICE OF HYDROPOWER LICENSING, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FERC NO. 2342005, CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 3–5 (1996),
available at http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Hydro/
Hydro_Licensing/Condit/Final_Environmental_Impact_Statement_FEIS_1996.pdf [hereinafter
CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS] (stating that since 1913 more than 2 million cubic yards
of sediment had accumulated in Northwestern Lake, the former reservoir above Condit Dam).
130 VALLANCE, supra note 129, at 1, 20.
131 See OFFICE OF HYDROPOWER LICENSING, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DRAFT EIS:
CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, FERC. NO. P-2342-005, at 6 (1996) (citing the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s comments on the Condit dam); Joan Laatz, Dam’s Fate Lies
on Salmon Issue, OREGONIAN, Aug. 9, 1993, at A8. Husum Falls, a 15-foot waterfall located
sixteen miles upstream from the confluence with the Columbia, formed a natural barrier for
some, but not all migrating fish. See NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, supra note 128, at 2.
132 The Yakama Tribe ceded the land area adjacent to the White Salmon River to the federal
government by treaty in 1855. The tribe retained the right to take fish from the “usual and
accustomed places.” Treaty between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians,
art. III, June 9, 1855; see also Scott Learn, A White Salmon River Free of Condit Dam is
Monumental for Tribal Elder, Kayaker and a Fish Biologist, OREGONIAN, Oct. 22, 2011,
http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2011/10/for_a_tribal_elder_a_kayaker_a.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
133 See PACIFICORP, HISTORY OF THE CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 16 (2002), available at
http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Hydro/Hydro_Licensin
g/Condit/HAERReport.pdf.
134 See id. at 17.
135 See id. at 23.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101448

TOJCI.BLUMM&ERICKSON.DOC

1060

11/26/2012 8:43 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 42:1043

concrete gravity dam.136 The completed Condit Dam stood 125 feet tall,
spanned 471 feet wide, and formed Northwestern Lake, a 2.3-mile long, 97acre reservoir.137
The Condit Dam’s power plant produced about 15 MW of electricity,138 a
significant source of power in the early 1900s. The Crown Columbia paper
mill used only 20% of the electricity, so Northwestern Electric marketed the
remaining 80% throughout the Columbia River Gorge, including to the cities
of Portland, Oregon and Vancouver, Washington.139 Completion of the Condit
Dam coincided with a downturn in the area’s economy from 1913 to 1915,
which provided Northwestern an advantage in the electricity market
because it could supply power from the Condit project more cheaply than its
competitors.140 In the first years of power production, Northwestern supplied
one-third of the area’s market share and was hugely profitable; the company
later merged with the Pacific Power and Light Company in 1947, which
became PacifiCorp in 1984.141
The Condit Dam completely blocked fish passage from the lower 3.3
miles of the White Salmon to the upper sections of the river and tributaries.142
As part of the original design, the dam included wooden fish ladders; however,
within the first few years after construction spring floods destroyed the
wooden ladders, as well as their concrete replacements, which were not
designed to withstand high water.143 From 1917 until the dam’s removal in
2011, the Condit Dam provided no fish passage facilities, resulting in a
catastrophic decline in the river’s native fish populations.144 Prior to dam
removal, migrating anadromous fish were no longer present in the upper
White Salmon River, and most fish spawning in the lower 3.3 miles were
hatchery fish.145 By removing the Condit Dam, biologists estimated that an

136

See id. at 1, 31–32.
See id. at 9, 40.
138 See Becker, supra note 21, at 818.
139 See PACIFICORP, supra note 133, at 18–19.
140 Id. at 19.
141 Id. at 19–20.
142 See Becker, supra note 21, at 817. More than two-thirds of the White Salmon River is
protected from development and degradation. Id. at 820. Over 27 miles of the upstream
137

segments of the White Salmon have been designated as federally protected wild and scenic
river. Id.; Upper White Salmon River Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 109-44, § 2, 119 Stat.
443 (2005) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(167) (2006)). The lower 3.3 miles of river
are within the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area. Columbia Gorge National Scenic
Area Act, Pub. L. No. 99-663, § 13(c), 100 Stat. 427, 44294 (1986) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1274(a)(61) (2006)).
143 Charlton H. Bonham, Comment, The Condit Dam Removal and Section 18 of the Federal
Power Act: A Coerced Settlement, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 97, 110 (1999); CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC
PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129, at 3-28.
144 See Becker, supra note 21, at 818; Bonham, supra note 143; CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC
PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129, at 3-28 to 3-29
145 See CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129, at 3-16 to 3-21; Bonham, supra
note 143.
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additional fourteen miles of salmon spawning habitat and thirty-three miles of
steelhead habitat would be accessible in the upper river and tributaries.146

B. The Federal Power Act, Relicensing, and Dam Removal Efforts
Since completion of the Condit Dam preceded federal laws regulating
the construction and operation of non-federal dams, the dam received its
first twenty-year license in 1968,147 after the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted
the Federal Power Act of 1935 (FPA)148 to reach non-navigable tributaries of
navigable waters.149 Near the expiration date of Condit’s operating license,
FERC began the dam relicensing process.150 In 1996, FERC issued a final EIS
on the license renewal that required the dam operator, PacifiCorp, to
construct permanent fish passage facilities, making the continued operation
and relicensing of the dam uneconomical.151 As a result, in 1999, PacifiCorp
signed a settlement agreement with the Yakama Tribe and environmental
groups to withdraw the license renewal request and remove the Condit
Dam.152 For the next twelve years, a staggering complexity of federal and
state bureaucracies, permitting requirements, and community opposition
delayed the eventual removal of the dam.

1. The Federal Power Act and FERC Relicensing
Since 1920, the FPA has authorized FERC to license non-federally
owned dams operating on the navigable waters of the United States.153
Section 18 of the FPA requires every non-federal dam applying for licensing
to provide for the “construction, maintenance, and operation by a licensee at
its own expense of . . . such fishways as may be prescribed by” FWS or
NMFS.154 In 1986, Congress amended the FPA to require FERC to condition
146 See WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL EIS: CONDIT DAM REMOVAL 4.3-22
(2005) [hereinafter WASHINGTON DSEIS]; Becker, supra note 21, at 819. Since 1917, the Yakama
Tribe has been unable to exercise their legal right to fish for salmon and steelhead at their
“usual and accustomed” fishing sites. See Becker, supra note 21, at 820. Condit Dam also
blocked recreational opportunities, including the potential for world-class white water kayaking
and rafting. Id.
147 CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129, at 3-29; see Bonham, supra note
143, at 99.
148 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–828c (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
149 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Union Elec. Power, 381 U.S. 90, 98 (1965).
150 Becker, supra note 21, at 824.
151 Id. at 824–26.
152 See id. at 826–27.
153 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006). Becker, supra note 21, at 821. FERC was
known as the Federal Power Commission until 1977. Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The
Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing,
26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 85 (2001).
154 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2006). See Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 201 F.3d 1186, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) (FERC must include agency fishway
recommendations as part of the dam’s license). In 2005, Congress amended the FPA to provide
new procedures for dam operators to propose alternatives to fish and wildlife protections or
mitigation measures recommended by FWS or NMFS. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L.
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licenses on the implementation of measures recommended by federal and
state wildlife agencies to protect and mitigate potential damages to fish and
wildlife.155 In addition to protecting fish and wildlife, state agencies may also
impose water quality conditions on non-federal dam operators, and FERC
must include the state water quality standards in the license.156
The first twenty-five year FERC license granted to the Condit Dam
contained few fish requirements, although it did include a condition for
maintaining minimal flows downstream from the dam.157 In 1982, in
anticipation of the expiration of the license and out of concern for the ESAlisted salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River Basin, the Northwest
Power and Conservation Council (NPCC), an interstate compact agency
charged by Congress with restoring Columbia Basin salmon runs,158 adopted
the position that any relicensing of the Condit Dam should include provisions
for fish passage.159 Soon after this first call for fish passage facilities, the
Yakama Indian Nation, the Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission
(CRITFC), and multiple environmental groups began advocating for removal
of the Condit Dam or, at least, the installation of adequate fish passage to
promote salmon recovery.160 In 1991, PacifiCorp submitted an application for
relicensing the Condit Dam, proposing to implement several changes to the
license, including increasing the operating capacity of the power plant,
establishing target flows to benefit fish habitat, and carrying out other projects
to facilitate recreation and cultural preservation.161
Amid a charged political atmosphere concerning dam removal, FERC
began work on a draft EIS on the relicensing of the Condit Dam.162 FERC’s

109-58, § 241(c), 119 Stat. 594, 675 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). Federal agencies
must then make a final determination to accept or reject proposed alternatives, based on
whether the proposal would adequately protect the resource. 16 U.S.C. § 832d(a) (governing
reserved lands), § 832d(b) (governing fishways). This has led at least one author to conclude
that the 2005 Federal Power Act Amendments may make it more time consuming and difficult
for agencies to condition licenses on fish protection measures. Becker, supra note 21, at 867–68.
155 Electric Consumer Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (amending
the Federal Power Act); see Becker, supra note 21, at 822.
156 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722–23
(1994) (states may impose water quality conditions on dams under section 401 of the Clean
Water Act); Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 129 F.3d 99, 110–11 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating that FERC may not reject or modify the state water quality conditions issued under
section 401); see Blumm & Nadol, supra note 153, at 107 n.176.
157 See Becker, supra note 21, at 824; Bonham, supra note 143, at 114 n.107.
158 NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, BRIEFING BOOK 7–9 (2010), available at http://www.
nwcouncil.org/library/2010/2010-13.pdf.
159 NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH & WILDLIFE PROGRAM 7–
11 (1982); see Becker, supra note 21, at 824. The original FERC license expired in 1993. Id. at
824 n.83.
160 See Becker, supra note 21, at 824; CHRIS WATSON, RELICENSING THE NORTHWEST: A STUDY
OF THE CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 3 (1995); CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra
note 129, at 4-59 to 4-60.
161 See CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129, at 2-7. PacifiCorp’s proposals
included a total investment of almost $10 million in improvement and mitigation measures. Id.
at C-1.
162 See Becker, supra note 21, at 825; WATSON, supra note 160, at 40.
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final EIS in 1996 included the fishway prescriptions of the FWS and NMFS,
conditioning the relicensing of the dam on the installation of upstream and
downstream fish passage facilities.163 In 1997, PacifiCorp requested that
FERC stay a final decision on the relicensing application164 because the cost
of the required fish passage facilities, $30 million, made relicensing the
Condit Dam uneconomical.165 Instead of making the improvements and
investments necessary to relicense the dam, PacifiCorp decided to pursue
the most economically efficient alternative: dam removal.166

2. The 1999 Agreement, Federal and State Regulatory Approval, and License
Forfeiture
In 1999, PacifiCorp entered into a settlement agreement with the
Yakama Tribe, CRITFC, and several environmental groups, in which the
company agreed to begin dam removal by October 2006.167 The agreement
capped removal costs at $17.15 million and allowed PacifiCorp to continue
operating the dam until 2006.168 The removal plan called for blasting the dam
and leaving the sediments in place to minimize costs.169 PacifiCorp submitted
the agreement to FERC in 1999. However, the novel issue of whether FERC
should construe the agreement as surrendering the operating license or
modifying the application to renew the license occupied the agency for two
years.170 Finally, in 2002, FERC issued a supplemental EIS approving the
removal plan and determining that the agency would treat the agreement as
a license surrender, contingent on PacifiCorp receiving the necessary
approvals from other federal and state regulatory agencies.171
The presence of at least five ESA-listed species of fish in the White
Salmon ecosystem also necessitated consultation with the FWS and NMFS,
and a determination that the removal plan would not adversely affect the
listed species or their critical habitat.172 In 2004, the FWS designated critical
habitat for bull trout in the river, concluding in its biological opinion (BiOp)

163 See Becker, supra note 21, at 826; CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129,
at ix–xii, 2-35 to 2-38. FERC rejected PacifiCorp’s $15 million proposal to “trap and haul” fish
around the dam. Id. at I-71 to I-74.
164 See PacifiCorp Motion to Stay Proceedings in Application for New License at 1–2, Condit
Hydroelectric Project, FERC No. P-2342-005 (Jan. 17, 1997), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=8422819:0.
165 See Becker, supra note 21, at 826; CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FEIS, supra note 129,
at I-71.
166 See Becker, supra note 21, at 826.
167 Condit Hydroelectric Project Settlement Agreement at 7, FERC Project No. P-2342-011
(Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=
146919.0.
168 Id. at 7–8; see Becker, supra note 21, at 827.
169 Condit Hydroelectric Project Settlement Agreement, supra note 167, at 7; see Becker,
supra note 21, at 827.
170 See Becker, supra note 21, at 830–31.
171 See id. at 831.
172 Both FWS and NMFS signed the 1999 settlement agreement. Condit Hydroelectric Project
Settlement Agreement, supra note 167, at 1.
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that dam removal would benefit the species despite insignificant,
short-term harms.173 In 2006, NMFS reached the same conclusion concerning
ESA-listed salmon.174
In addition to the time spent waiting for biological studies and federal
agency approval, the Condit Dam removal suffered from delays due to state
and local regulations.175 Almost immediately after PacifiCorp announced that
it intended to remove the Condit Dam, local opposition, particularly from the
Washington counties of Klickitat and Skamania, made clear that local
regulations and requirements would be used to delay or derail the dam
removal proposal.176 The counties objected to the dam removal project
because of the possible negative effects on the aesthetic views of
homeowners along the river, the loss of recreation on Northwestern Lake,
and the remediation plan that called for leaving sediments in place.177 The
counties advised FERC and PacifiCorp that the project would have to satisfy
local regulations, including requirements for floodplain, zoning, shoreline,
noise, and road permits.178 PacifiCorp appealed to FERC for relief from the
counties’ attempt to delay the dam removal process.179 In 2006, FERC issued
an order declaring that the FPA preempted state and local laws unless FERC
chose to include such laws in the license or a license surrender order.180
The threat of a lawsuit from the counties prompted the state of
Washington, a supporter of dam removal, to decide to conduct its own
environmental analysis of the dam removal.181 The state’s Department of
Ecology issued a state EIS in 2007, which acknowledged that water quality
and fish would be negatively affected in the short term.182 The state EIS
included mitigation measures for some of the possible short-term effects
that would occur due to blasting the dam and releasing massive amounts of
water and sediments.183

173

See Becker, supra note 21, at 839–40.
See id. at 840.
175 See id. at 839.
176 See id. at 840–41.
177 See id. at 828; Becky Blanton, PacifiCorp, State and Federal Agencies Accused of
Conspiracy, SIERRA TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001 (On file with authors).
178 See Letter from Curt Dreyer, Klickitat County Planning Dep’t, to Gail Miller, PacifiCorp
1–3 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?
174

Doc=10744978:0.
179 See PacifiCorp’s Petition for Declaratory Order on Preemption at 12, Condit
Hydroelectric Project, FERC No. P-2342-018 (Oct. 14, 2005), http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/
nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=10855144:0.
180 Order on Petition for Declaratory Order, PacifiCorp, 115 FERC ¶ 61,194 (2006).
181 See Becker, supra note 21, at 839, 841.
182 WASHINGTON DSEIS, supra note 146, at 1-12 to 1-18. See Washington State Environmental
Policy Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) (2005) (requiring an EIS for proposed actions
with significant environmental impacts).
183 WASHINGTON DSEIS, supra note 146, at 1-12 to 1-22. Washington continued to supplement
the DEIS from 2007 to 2010. A final supplemental EIS was completed in January, 2010. WASH.
DEP’T. OF ECOLOGY, CONDIT DAM REMOVAL FINAL SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT ii (2010), available at https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/
0912017.pdf.
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Before beginning the dam removal, PacifiCorp needed a section 401
certification from the state of Washington to confirm that the project met the
state’s water quality standards under the Clean Water Act.184 In 2003,
Washington amended the state’s water quality standards to include a shortterm exemption for remediation projects.185 The state concluded that the shortterm harms of the dam removal project were outweighed by its long-term
benefits, and in 2010, the state issued the required section 401 certification.186
After obtaining the section 401 certification, PacifiCorp received the
final permits necessary from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act187 and section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act.188 In 2011, FERC accepted PacifiCorp’s license surrender.189
Twelve years after agreeing to removal, PacifiCorp had satisfied all of the
federal and state procedures and received the necessary permits to begin
removing the Condit Dam.

3. The Dam Removal Process
On October 26, 2011, the Condit Dam was breached, and the removal of
the nearly century-old structure began.190 Engineers cleared sediment and
debris immediately upstream from the dam, and then drilled and blasted a
thirteen-by-eighteen foot drain tunnel at the base of the dam.191 The final
blast sent a rush of water downstream at a rate of over 10,000 cubic feet per
second into the lower White Salmon, releasing as much as 2.4 million cubic
yards of sediment trapped upstream in the reservoir.192 The reservoir drained
through the tunnel in approximately six hours, opening space in the
reservoir for engineers to begin remediation activities, including bank

184 Becker, supra note 21, at 838–39. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (2006).
185 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-330(4)(a), 320(4)(a) (2011) (“[R]emediation of
environmental or public health threats” is one of several factors to consider when deciding
to lower water quality standards as part of a “temporary action necessary to protect the
public interest.”).
186 See WASH. DEP’T. OF ECOLOGY, CONDIT DAM DECOMMISSIONING PROJECT, 401 WATER
QUALITY CERTIFICATION ORDER NO. 8049 at 1–3 (2010), available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
programs/wq/ferc/existingcerts/conditcertdecomm.pdf.
187 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).
188 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2006). U.S. ARMY CORPS
ENG’RS, PERMIT NWP-2004-523 at 1, 20 (2011), available at http://www.
OF
pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Hydro/Hydro_Licensing/Condit/20
110513USACOE404PermitFrontMaterial.pdf.
189 Order on Rehearing, Denying Stay, and Dismissing Extension of Time Request,
PacifiCorp, Project No. 2342-021, 135 FERC ¶ 61,064 (Apr. 21, 2011).
190 Wash Dep’t. of Ecology, Condit Dam Removal Project, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
programs/wr/cwp/condit.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). For videos and photos of the blast
and water release, see PacifiCorp, Condit Dam: Videos, http://www.pacificorp.com/about/
newsroom/mr/cdmr.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
191 PacifiCorp, Condit: Project Overview, http://www.pacificorp.com/es/hydro/hl/condit.
html# (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (click on “Decommissioning Activities” link at top of page).
192

Id.
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stabilization and the excavation and removal of the dam structure.193
Removals of the dam structure and the original cofferdam continue as of
this writing.

C. Restoring the White Salmon River
Ecologists expect the negative short-term effects of the dam removal,
including increased turbidity and downstream fish kills, to be outweighed by
the long-term benefits within six to twelve months after removal.194 In order
to mitigate potential short-term adverse effects, biologists trapped 500
chinook salmon from the lower Columbia and White Salmon Rivers and
transported them upstream.195 After blasting the dam and releasing
sediments from the reservoir, fishery biologists expect the increased
salmon and steelhead habitat to benefit the fish populations and the
entire ecosystem.196
IV. THE SANDY RIVER BASIN: DECOMMISSIONING
THE BULL RUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
The Sandy River drains the northwest slopes of Mt. Hood in western
Oregon, flowing from its glacial headwaters over volcanic ash and rock
deposits for more than fifty miles to the Columbia River.197 The river and its
tributaries receive water from high volumes of rain and snow precipitation
in the Cascade Range, glacial melts, and groundwater recharge.198 Large
amounts of fine suspended sediment, glacial silt caused by the slow-grinding
glacial erosion of underlying rocks, and sand deposits found throughout the
basin contributed to the river’s nomenclature.199 The shallow gravel beds
created ideal spawning habitat for the abundant populations of migrating
salmon and steelhead that traveled upstream from the Columbia River to the
Sandy River’s headwaters.200 Historically, the first inhabitants of the area,
tribes from villages along the Columbia and Clackamas Rivers, used trails
following the Sandy River to upland hunting and gathering grounds, and they
fished the abundant salmon runs in the river and its tributaries.201

193
194

Id.
See WASHINGTON DSEIS, supra note 146, at 1-9.
See ROD ENGLE ET AL., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CAPTURE

195
AND TRANSPORT OF LOWER
COLUMBIA RIVER FALL CHINOOK SALMON PLAN, CONDIT HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT DECOMMISSIONING
2 (2011).
196 Becker, supra note 21, at 819–821.
197 See BARBARA TAYLOR, SALMON AND STEELHEAD RUNS AND RELATED EVENTS OF THE SANDY
RIVER BASIN: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (1998).
198 See id. at 8.
199 See id. at 10.
200 See id. at 12–13, 28.
201 Id. at 13–14; see also U.S. FOREST SERV., UPPER SANDY NATIONAL WATERSHED ANALYSIS
1 (1996).
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A. The Little Sandy and Marmot Dams
In the late 1800s, population and industrial growth in Portland, Oregon
produced widespread interest in using nearby rivers for water supplies and
hydroelectricity.202 Developers soon invested in small dams and diversions to
bring water from the Bull Run River, a tributary of the Sandy River, to
Portland, thirty miles west of the Bull Run and Sandy confluence.203 In 1906,
the Mt. Hood Railway and Power Company, which later became Pacific Gas
Electric (PGE), constructed a powerhouse along the Bull Run River and a
small diversion dam on the Little Sandy River, a tributary of the Bull Run.204
The Little Sandy Dam stood sixteen feet high and completely blocked the
flow of the Little Sandy River 1.7 miles upstream from its confluence with
the Bull Run.205 The dam channeled the Little Sandy River into a wood box
flume diversion, which carried the water more than three miles to Roslyn
Lake where the Mt. Hood Company stored the water for releases to generate
electricity at the Bull Run powerhouse.206 Completion of the Little Sandy
Dam in 1912 blocked salmon passage to upstream sections of the Little
Sandy River and drastically reduced downstream flows.207
The success of the Little Sandy Dam and Bull Run powerhouse led to an
increased demand for water supplies to bolster hydroelectric output from
the project. In 1913, the Mt. Hood Company constructed the Marmot Dam on
the mainstem of the Sandy River.208 The Marmot Dam diverted stream flows
into tunnels and canals that transported the water north across the
hydrologic divide that separated the mainstem of the Sandy River from the
Little Sandy.209 The series of diversion channels, including nearly mile-long
tunnels bored underneath the mountains separating the two watersheds,
transported water from the Sandy River into the Little Sandy, upstream of
the Little Sandy Dam.210 Since 1913, the Bull Run powerhouse supplied about
22 MW of electricity to consumers in the Portland area.211
The original Marmot Dam consisted of a wood frame structure filled
with rock and sediment to divert stream flows into the diversion canals.212
Engineers included a wooden fish ladder to allow salmon to travel upstream
and, as a result, the dam never completely blocked upstream salmon passage
to pristine spawning habitat above the dam.213 In 1989, the current dam
202
203

See TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 15.
See id. at 22; see also City of Portland, Bull Run Watershed, http://www.portland

oregon.gov/water/29784 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
204

See id.
See id. at 22, 39.
206 See Portland General Electric, Marmot Dam Removal in 2007 Has Returned Sandy River
to a Wild, Free-flowing River, http://www.portlandgeneral.com/community_environment/
205

initiatives/protecting_fish/sandy_river/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
207 See TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 39.
208 Id. at 22.
209
210
211
212
213

See id.
See id.
See Portland General Electric, supra note 206.
See TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 39.
See id. at 23.
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owner, PGE, rebuilt the Marmot Dam by replacing the original thirty-foot
wood frame and rocks with a forty-seven-foot concrete structure,214 complete
with modernized fish ladders.215 However, problems with downstream
passage of salmon continued to wreak havoc on the river’s fish
populations.216 The diversion channels funneled downstream migrating
salmon into the long tunnels and canals, killing them or depositing them in
the Little Sandy River where they would face another dam and diversion to
Roslyn Lake.217 Beginning in 1951, fishery biologists attempted to prevent
salmon from entering the diversions with screens and collection points
within the canals and tunnels.218 Despite these efforts, downstream passage
remained perilous for migrating salmon.219
The Bull Run hydroelectric project (Little Sandy and Marmot Dams,
their diversions, and the Bull Run powerhouse) caused significant
environmental declines in the Sandy River watershed. Historic salmon runs
totaled tens of thousands of coho, fall and spring chinook, and winter
steelhead.220 The dams and diversions reduced the Sandy River basin’s fish
population to between 10% and 25% of historic runs.221 The hydroelectric
project also drastically reduced stream flows in the Sandy and Little Sandy
Rivers.222 Although a 1973 agreement established minimum instream flows
for the Sandy River below the Marmot Dam, the diversions continued to
reduce flows and instream habitat for ten miles below the dams.223

B. The Settlement Agreement to Remove the Dams
The history of the Little Sandy and Marmot dam removals in the Sandy
River basin contrasts significantly with the sagas that unfolded in the Elwha
and White Salmon basins.224 The Sandy River dams, like the Elwha, Glines
Canyon, and Condit Dams, produced profitable hydroelectricity for urban
areas.225 Yet the operator of the Sandy River dams, PGE, decided early in the
FERC relicensing process to surrender the license and remove the dams
voluntarily.226 A settlement agreement signed by PGE, federal agencies,
environmental organizations, and state and local governments in 2002
214
215
216
217
218

See id. at 39.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 23–24.
See id.
See id. (demonstrating continued efforts to reduce salmon mortality).

219 OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, DRAFT EIS: BULL RUN PROJECT,
FERC PROJECT NO. 477-024, at 118 (2003) [hereinafter BULL RUN DEIS].
220 See TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 1.
221 See id. (comparing runs to 1890 levels).
222 PGE diverted up to 800 cubic feet per second of combined flow from the rivers. BULL RUN
DEIS, supra note 219, at 7; TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 22.
223 See TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 9; BULL RUN DEIS, supra note 219, at 4, 5.
224 See Becker, supra note 21, at 832 n.135.
225 See id.; cf. TAYLOR, supra note 197, at 21–22 (describing how the need for low-cost
hydropower led to the development of hydropower projects in the Sandy River basin).
226 See Application to Amend and Surrender License, Bull Run Hydroelectric Project, 1–2
FERC No. P-477-024 (Nov. 12, 2002).
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coincided with PGE’s license surrender to FERC.227 River restoration work
began less than six years later, with PGE paying for the complete removal of
the dams and diversion channels.228

1. The Settlement Agreement and FERC License Surrender
The Little Sandy and Marmot Dams received their first FERC license in
1980,229 authorizing the hydroelectric dams to operate for a thirty-year term
that expired in 2004.230 Near the end of the thirty-year period, PGE
considered relicensing the project, but after studying the potential
conditions and prescriptions associated with FERC relicensing, “PGE
determined that the likely cost of environmental protection, mitigation, and
enhancement measures associated with relicensing would make continued
operation of the Project uneconomical.”231 In 1999, PGE notified FERC that
the company did not intend to relicense the dams.232 FERC responded by
giving PGE until 2002 to develop a plan to surrender the current license and
remove the dams.233
In 2001, PGE convened a meeting of stakeholders, including
environmental organizations, federal agencies, and state and local officials,
to discuss removing the dams.234 The settlement agreement produced a
timeline for removal and established that PGE would pay all costs of
removal and restoration.235 All parties agreed that the Bull Run hydroelectric
project would remain operational until November 2007, and that the Marmot
and Little Sandy Dams would be removed in the fall of 2007 and 2008,
respectively.236 In 2003, just eighteen months after entering the settlement

227 See Settlement Agreement Concerning the Removal of the Bull Run Hydroelectric
Project, FERC No. P-477-024 (Oct. 24, 2002), available at http://digital.library.ucr.edu/
cdri/?dam=Marmot_Dam (beginning on page 76 of the FERC-compiled document).
228 See id. at 71; see also Application to Amend and Surrender License, supra note 226, at 32–33.
229 FERC licensed the dams in 1980, effective as of 1974, which operated in the interim with
annual licenses. Joint Explanatory Statement and Request for Approval of Decommissioning
Settlement Agreement 3 (Nov. 12, 2002), in Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Application to Amend and
Surrender License for Project #477 – Bull Run Hydroelectric Project, FERC Docket No. p-477024, at 9, available at http://digital.library.ucr.edu/cdri/documents/p477_Application
toAmendandSurrender.pdf; Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 11 F.E.R.C. 62,145, 63,268 (1980). This was
done after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Federal Power Commission v. Union Electric Co., 381
U.S. 90, 97 (1965), applied the FPA licensing requirement to dams on non-navigable tributaries
of navigable rivers.
230 Request for Approval of Decommissioning Settlement Agreement, supra note 229.
231

Id.
Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 4. For a general discussion of this decommissioning project, see Julie A. Keil, Bull
Run Decommissioning: Paving the Way for Hydro’s Future, HYDROWORLD.COM, http://www.
232

hydroworld.com/index/display/article-display/353949/articles/hydro-review/volume-28/issue-2/
feature-articles/dam-removal/bull-run-decommissioning-paving-the-way-for-hydrorsquos-future.
html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
235 Request for Approval of Decommissioning Settlement Agreement, supra note 229, at 4.
236 Application to Amend and Surrender License, supra note 226, at 30; Order Approving
Decommissioning Plan, 119 FERC ¶ 62,224 (June 14, 2007).
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agreement,237 PGE secured the necessary environmental approvals for dam
removal,238 and FERC completed an EIS on decommissioning the Bull Run
hydroelectric project.239 FERC accepted PGE’s license surrender for the
Little Sandy and Marmot Dams, and approved the decommissioning plan
in 2004.240
The process for approving dam removal in the Sandy River differed
from projects on the Elwha and White Salmon Rivers in several respects.
First, unlike the Elwha and White Salmon dams, the owner of the Sandy
River dams agreed to pay for the complete removal without predetermined
cost caps.241 In 2002, PGE estimated that it would spend about $17 million on
the dam removals and lose over $5 million because of decreased power
production,242 although the utility later adjusted the dam removal costs to
$23.7 million in 2009.243 Second, the state and local governments fully
supported the Sandy River dam removals by signing the settlement
agreement and supplying the necessary environmental authorizations in less
than two years.244 Oregon also lacked a state environmental policy act, which
counties in Washington used to delay the Condit Dam removal.245 Third,
unlike the Condit Dam where local landowners objected to the removal of
Northwestern Lake’s recreational opportunities, the federal government
owned much of the remote, unpopulated land surrounding the Sandy River
dams, including the Mt. Hood National Forest and BLM lands.246 Few private
individuals owned land near the Sandy River dams, and the Forest Service
and BLM supported dam removal.247
The removal process for the Sandy River dams also proceeded as a
hydroelectric license surrender, not an amendment to a license renewal.248
Once PGE submitted the surrender request, FERC responded according to

237

Becker, supra note 21, at 832 n.135.
OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, CLEAN WATER ACT § 401 CERTIFICATION FOR
THE DECOMMISSIONING OF THE BULL RUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (FERC PROJECT NO. 477),
at 1 (2003).
239 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NO. 477-024 FINAL EIS: BULL RUN HYDROELECTRIC
PROJECT, OREGON (2003).
240 See Order Approving Decommissioning Plan, supra note 236, at 3.
241 See Becker, supra note 21, at 832 n.135.
242 Application to Amend and Surrender License, supra note 226, at 32–33.
243 Portland Gen. Elec. OPUC Docketed Filings: Direct Testimony and Exhibits, Revenue
Requirements 9 (Feb. 27, 2008), www.portlandgeneral.com/our_company/corporate_info/
regulatory_documents/filings/docketed_filings/UE-197/default.aspx (click on the “Revenue
Requirements” link).
244 See Becker, supra note 21, at 835 n.135.
245 See ENERGY FACILITY SITING TASK FORCE, STATE OF OR., COMPARISON OF THE ENERGY
FACILITY SITING REQUIREMENTS OF OREGON, WASHINGTON, MONTANA, AND CALIFORNIA, in REPORT
OF THE ENERGY FACILITY SITING TASK FORCE, at A-233, available at http://www.
oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/docs/TFR/TFR_U.pdf.
246 Settlement Agreement Concerning the Removal of the Bull Run Hydroelectric Project,
supra note 227, at 1–2
238

247
248

See id.
See id. at 2.
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established regulations.249 Unlike with the Condit Dam, where FERC
struggled to determine how to treat an amendment for license renewal as a
license surrender, with the Sandy River dam removals, the process of
securing FERC approval occurred quickly in part because FERC now
understood the procedures for license surrender.250

2. The Removal Procedures
In September 2007, engineers used explosives to breach the Marmot
Dam, releasing water and sediments trapped behind the dam.251 The
explosion and sudden release of water washed much of the 900,000 cubic
yards of sediment downstream, with the river eroding the remaining
sediments in a matter of months.252 The last coffer dam was breached on
October 19, 2007, ending the diversions and returning the rivers to natural
flows.253 The final steps in the dam removal process—drainage of Roslyn
Lake and removal of the Little Sandy Dam and diversion channels—occurred
in May and September 2008, respectively.254

C. Restoring the Sandy River Basin
PGE donated all lands that the company owned for the Bull Run
hydroelectric project to a conservation organization, the Western Rivers
Conservancy, which in turn provided the lands to the BLM for restoration
projects.255 In the years following the Sandy River dam removals, the BLM
engaged in restoration projects throughout the basin to return the ecosystem
to its natural condition.256 After removal of the dams, stream flows returned
to natural levels, restoring 6.5 miles of salmon habitat in the upper
Little Sandy River and 10 miles in the lower Sandy River below the former
Marmot Dam.257

249 See 18 C.F.R. pt. 16 (2009) (governing takeover and relicensing requests); Order Granting
Surrender Application, Adopting Proposed Terms, and Denying Application to Amend License,
107 FERC ¶ 61,158 (May 12, 2004).
250 See Becker, supra note 21, at 832 n.135; supra Part III.B.2.
251 See Michael Milstein, River Proves There’s Life After Dam, OREGONIAN, July 30, 2008,
at A1, A7.
252

See id.

253

Portland Gen. Elec., supra note 206.
254 See Keil, supra note 234.
255 See FINAL EIS: BULL RUN HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT, supra note 239, at 8, 178.
256 Bureau of Land Mgmt, Sandy River Basin Plan: Final Plan Released for Sandy River Basin,
http://www.blm.gov/or/districts/salem/plans/sandy_river_index.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
257 See BULL RUN DEIS, supra note 219, at 4–5.
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V. THE ROGUE RIVER: RESTORING THE WILD AND SCENIC RIVER
The Rogue River flows west for over 215 miles from its headwaters near
Crater Lake to the Pacific Ocean.258 The river and its tributaries drain a
significant land area in southwest Oregon,259 cutting through three mountain
ranges and across four climate zones.260 For thousands of years before nonnative settlement, the Rogue River’s abundant fisheries sustained native
tribes in the area, providing over 4,000 river miles of salmon habitat.261 As
non-native settlers populated the Rogue Basin in the nineteenth century, the
river became widely known for plentiful wild salmon262—the largest
population wholly in Oregon263—and recreational opportunities.264 The
narrow rock canyons and steep gradients through the Cascade Range make
the Rogue River an extremely popular whitewater river.265 In 1968, Congress
designated the Rogue among the nation’s first wild and scenic rivers,
protecting eighty-four miles of the lower river from development and
preserving habitat for the remaining wild salmon.266

A. Fragmenting the River: Dams Throughout the Rogue Basin
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, population growth and
agricultural activities in the Rogue River Basin created a demand for water
and power to supply the region’s newest towns and farms.267 The Rogue
Basin currently contains over eighty dams, ranging in size from small
diversion dams to massive hydroelectric projects.268 Before dam removal on
the Rogue began in 2008, returning adult salmon travelled over 107 miles
from the Pacific Ocean in the near-pristine river before encountering their

258 Bureau
of Land Mgmt, The Rogue River, http://www.blm.gov/or/resources/
recreation/rogue/index.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2012); Joe S. Whitworth, A Relic Dam
Dislodged by a Dormant Doctrine: The Story of Beneficial Use and Savage Rapids Dam,
5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 183, 189 (2001).
259 The basin drains an area of over 5,000 square miles. See OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
ROGUE RIVER BASIN TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD, at 1-2 (2008); Whitworth, supra note 258,
at 187.
260 OR. DEP’T. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 259, at 1-2 to 1-3.
261 See Rogue River Keeper, Rogue River Watershed, http://rogueriverkeeper.org/who-weare/watershed (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
262 The designated wild and scenic river portion extends from 7 miles west of Grants Pass to
11 miles east of Gold Beach. Bureau of Land Management, supra note 258.
263 Whitworth, supra note 258, at 189.
264 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE INT., ROGUE RIVER FLOAT GUIDE:
AMERICA’S GREAT OUTDOORS (2004) available at http://www.blm.gov/or/resources/recreation/
rogue/files/FloatGuide04.pdf.
265 Id. at 1.
266 Whitworth, supra note 258, at 189 n.37; Rogue National Wild and Scenic River, Oreg.,
Notice of Revised Development and Management Plans, 37 Fed. Reg. 13,408 (July 7, 1972); Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (Oct. 2, 1968).
267 See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 189–90.
268 ARTHUR C. BENKE & COLBERT E. CUSHING, RIVERS OF NORTH AMERICA 571 (2005).
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first dam at Savage Rapids.269 About twenty miles upstream from the Savage
Rapids Dam, the Gold Hill and Gold Ray Dams further segmented the river,
hindering salmon passage to the upstream stretches and tributaries.270 But
since 2008, dam owners have removed the Savage Rapids, Gold Hill, and
Gold Ray Dams,271 and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has notched a
fourth, the Elk Creek Dam, located upstream from the three mainstem dams
on Elk Creek, a major tributary of the Rogue.272

1. Savage Rapids Dam
In 1921, the Grants Pass Irrigation District (GPID), a private irrigation
organization in Jackson and Josephine Counties, Oregon, constructed the
Savage Rapids Dam about five miles east of Grants Pass, Oregon.273 Growing
numbers of settlers in southern Oregon during the early 1900s demanded
large amounts of water for irrigation, and the Savage Rapids Dam provided
the means to divert Rogue River water into a series of irrigation canals for
delivery to farms throughout the region.274 The thirty-nine-foot concrete
gravity and arch dam275 created a small reservoir from which hydraulic
turbines, a pumping plant, and gravity diversions channeled water into
irrigation canals.276 Although the original dam included fish ladders, fish
screens, and a fish bypass system installed in the 1970s, these measures
never succeeded in preventing downstream-migrating juvenile salmon from
entrainment in the irrigation system.277
The high levels of fish mortality at the irrigation intake pump
contributed to calls for the dam’s removal.278 In 1994, Oregon’s Water
Resources Commission granted an extension for the GPID’s water right for
withdrawal at Savage Rapids, but conditioned the extension on the GPID
continuing to operate in a manner consistent with the public interest.279 The
269 See WaterWatch, Savage Rapids Dam Removal, http://waterwatch.org/programs/freeingthe-rogue-river/savage-rapids-dam-removal (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
270 See Kim Murphy, Dam’s Demise Lets the Rogue River Run, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 10, 2009,
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2010036075_dam10.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
271 The dams are listed in geographic order from downstream to upstream. See Scott Learn,
Rogue Reclaims its Legacy, OREGONIAN, Oct. 29, 2010, at A1.
272 See Mark Freeman, End of a Controversial Dam, MAIL TRIB., July 16, 2008,
http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080716/NEWS/807160319/-1/NEWS19
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
273 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: FISH PASSAGE
IMPROVEMENTS, SAVAGE RAPIDS DAM, GRANTS PASS PROJECT, OREGON 2 (2005) [hereinafter
SAVAGE RAPIDS DEA], available at http://digital.library.ucr.edu/cdri/documents/SavageRapids
_DEA.pdf.
274 The irrigation project consisted of over 160 miles of canals. See id.
275 Engineers built the Savage Rapids Dam as a “combination gravity and multiple arch
concrete dam.” Id. at 3.
276

See id.

277

Even the most successful fish screens only managed to protect 90% of fish in the stream.

See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 191.
278 See WaterWatch, Savage Rapids Dam Removal Action Alert – 2006, http://waterwatch.org/
act-now-1/archive-savage-rapids-dam-removal-action-alert-8-9-2006 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
279 Whitworth, supra note 258, at 196.
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water right extension required the GPID to exercise “due diligence in
implementing approved conservation and fish passage plans” for Savage
Rapids Dam, which meant providing safe and effective fish passage for
migrating salmon.280 The state commission interpreted the conditions in the
water right to require removal of Savage Rapids Dam by 2001.281 In weighing
the public interest factors, the agency concluded that dam removal would
provide more benefits to the public than upgrading existing fish passage
facilities and keeping the low-cost irrigation system in place.282
Although GPID’s water right was conditioned on dam removal,
members of the GPID board of directors and water users throughout the
Rogue Basin remained steadfastly opposed to removing the Savage Rapids
Dam.283 From 1994 to 1998, the GPID board stalled progress to secure federal
authorization and funding for dam removal.284 Some GPID board members
expressed their desire to “Save Savage Rapids Dam” in letters to members of
Oregon’s congressional delegation,285 citing the dam’s benefits to the local
community, including providing recreation on the reservoir, supplying lowcost irrigation, and maintaining high property values near the reservoir.286
The GPID remained committed to the tradition and symbolism of the Savage
Rapids Dam, refusing a deal with the federal government in which the
government would pay for dam removal and purchase replacement water
pumps.287 Between 1998 and 2000, the GPID expended almost one-third of
the district’s operating budget—over $500,000—on legal fees fighting against
dam removal, including opposing changes to the district’s water rights,
challenging the imposition of fish mitigation measures, and suing former
district patrons who attempted to leave the district and cancel individual
water rights.288
Frustrated with the slow progress toward removing the Savage Rapids
Dam, in 1998, the Oregon Water Resources Commission determined that the
GPID had violated the terms of its water right by failing to diligently provide
fish conservation measures.289 At a 1998 hearing examining the GPID’s water
rights, the Commission reduced GPID’s diversion right by about 50%,290 an
action that the Oregon Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed.291
Environmentalists and federal agencies renewed their efforts to remove the

280
281
282
283
284
285
286

Id.
Id. at 197–98.
See id. at 200.
See id. at 198–99.
Whitworth, supra note 258, at 198–99.
See id. at 197–99.
Id. at 200; Jessica Robinson, Savage Rapids Lesson: Removing Dams No Easy Task, OR.

PUB. BROAD., June 23, 2009, http://www.opb.org/news/article/savage-rapids-lesson-removingdams-no-easy-task/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
287 See GROSSMAN, supra note 42, at 148–49.
288 Id. at 145, 149.
289 See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 201.
290

Id.

291

Grants Pass Irr. Dist. v. Water Res. Dep’t, 1 P.3d 480, 481 (Or. App. 2000).
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dam and joined the Commission in taking action against the GPID.292 In 1998,
NMFS filed a lawsuit against the GPID, alleging illegal takings of threatened
coho salmon by the irrigation project.293 NMFS called the Savage Rapids Dam
the “worst fish-killer on the Rogue”294 and conditioned any ESA incidental
take permit for continued operation of the irrigation project on
dam removal.295
The actions of the Commission and NMFS gave GPID little alternative
to removal.296 After studies indicated that dam removal provided the least
expensive means of solving the fish mortality problem, the GPID’s board of
directors passed a resolution authorizing the removal of the dam.297 Under
the GPID removal plan, pumping plants along the river near the dam site
would continue to supply water to the irrigation system after dam removal.298
A vote of 6,720 members of the GPID resulted in overwhelming support for
dam removal, clearing away opposition within the local community and
allowing the board to take proactive measures to implement removal
plans.299 In 2001, GPID entered a consent decree with NMFS, agreeing to
seek federal approval and funding to completely remove the dam by
November 2006.300
To fund the removal of the Savage Rapids Dam, the GPID needed the
support of the federal government.301 The ensuing political process to secure
federal authorization and funding resembled the saga that unfolded for the
Elwha dam removals.302 Like Elwha, funding for the Savage Rapids Dam
removal came in stages.303 In 2000, Oregon congressmen introduced the
Savage Rapids Dam Act,304 which would have provided $22.2 million for the
complete deconstruction of the dam.305 Although Congress failed to pass this
bill, the federal government appropriated $500,000 to study dam removal in
the Rogue basin.306 Then, in 2004, Congress’s energy and water
appropriations bill authorized the Bureau of Reclamation to install

292 See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 200–01. Environmental groups, federal agencies, and
tribes had been advocating for dam removal since the 1980s. Id. at 189 n.35.
293 Id. at 192.
294 Whitworth, supra note 258, at 184.
295 Id. at 201.
296
297
298
299
300

See id.
See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 196.
Id. at 196–97.
Id. at 201–02.
See Savage Rapids Pumping Facilities/Dam Removal Project, Josephine County, Rogue

River Basin, OR, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,144, 29,144 (May 20, 2004) (describing the dam
removal process).
301 See Whitworth, supra note 258, at 202.
302 See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text; see also Whitworth, supra note 258,
at 202 (describing positions of U.S. Senators Gordon Smith and Ron Wyden of Oregon, both
of whom supported dam removal as well as federal spending to upgrade the Grants Pass
irrigation system).
303 See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text.
304 Savage Rapids Dam Act of 2000, S. 3227, 106th Cong. (2000).
305 See id. § 5; Whitworth, supra note 258, at 202.
306

Id.
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replacement pumps to supply water for the GPID and to remove the dam.307
Between 2007 and 2008, Congress appropriated over $28 million for the
Savage Rapids Dam removal.308
Once the Bureau of Reclamation received the funding, removal
proceeded quickly because federal and state agencies and the local
community supported dam removal.309 The Bureau supplemented a 1996 EIS
studying dam removal, acquired a federal Clean Water Act section 404
permit and a state water quality certification, and garnered support from
other consulting agencies.310 The removal occurred in 2009, beginning with
the construction of an upstream cofferdam that allowed engineers to
deconstruct the dam in stages.311 Less than five months after deconstruction
began, the Rogue River flowed through Savage Rapids, eroding over 150,000
cubic yards of sediments from the reservoir within two weeks.312 Removal of
the Savage Rapids Dam allowed unimpeded passage to more than fifty miles
of the Rogue’s mainstem and 500 miles of upstream habitat for salmon
spawning,313 increasing the Rogue’s salmon population by an estimated
114,000 fish.314

2. Gold Hill Dam
Fifteen miles upstream from the Savage Rapids Dam, a small concrete
diversion dam blocked migrating salmon from continuing their journey up
the Rogue River.315 In the late 1800s, cement manufacturers began operating
in Gold Hill, Oregon, using massive amounts of river water diverted through
canals in connection with cement production.316 In the early 1920s, a cement
company constructed what was the first concrete diversion dam on the
Rogue at Gold Hill.317 In 1944, the company reconstructed the Gold Hill Dam,

307 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 220, 117
Stat. 1827, 1853 (2003).
308 Mark Freeman, Budget Boosts Savage Rapids Work, MAIL TRIB., Feb. 7,
2007, http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070207/NEWS/302079995&cid=
sitesearch (noting that the President’s 2007 budget allotted $13 million toward dam removal
projects and that the then-proposed 2008 budget sought to award an additional $15 million).
309 See Robinson, supra note 286.
310 See SAVAGE RAPIDS DEA, supra note 273, at 5–7 (2006).
311 See RICHARD D. BENIK, REMOVAL OF SAVAGE RAPIDS DIVERSION DAM – PART ONE, at 11
(2008), available at http://sunsite2.berkeley.edu/wrca/damremoval/documents/SavageRapids
Dam_USSD_2008.doc. Dam removal occurred in two phases. First, engineers diverted the river
around the right side of the dam while workers removed the left half the dam. Second, the
engineers shifted the cofferdam to direct the river to flow through the left half of the channel
while workers removed the right half. Id.
312 Id. at 14.
313 WaterWatch, supra note 269.
314

Id.

315

Or. Watershed Enhancement Bd., Exciting Progress in Removal of Fish Killer, http://
waterwatch.org/pressroom/press-clips/exciting-progress-in-removing-fish-killer (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012).
316 GEORGE KRAMER, OREGON INVENTORY OF HISTORIC PROPERTIES, SECTION 106
DOCUMENTATION FORM: CITY OF GOLD HILL/DAM REMOVAL PROJECT 5 (2007).
317

Id.
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adding a powerhouse for hydroelectric generation capable of producing 25
kilowatts (KW)—enough power to operate the cement factory with excess
to sell to residents of the area.318 Although small in stature, the three- to
fourteen-foot tall concrete dam posed problems for migrating salmon.319 The
dam provided fish ladders and fish screens, but failed to prevent fish
mortality from upstream and downstream-migrating salmon that entered the
diversion canals.320
In 1969, cement production in Gold Hill ended, and the owner-operators
of the dam abandoned the structure, which reverted to the City of Gold
Hill.321 The city unsuccessfully attempted to sell the dam and powerhouse to
electric utilities, including PacifiCorp, throughout the 1980s.322 Although the
powerhouse had been shut off since 1969, the city continued to use the dam
and diversion channels to supply water for irrigation and municipal use, but
the dam contributed an insignificant amount of water for use in the region.323
Growing interest in dam removal and river restoration as a way to
increase wild salmon populations in the Rogue led to proposals to remove
the Gold Hill Dam.324 Because of the insignificant water diversions,325 the
NMFS pressured the city to remove the dam in order to facilitate coho
salmon recovery.326 In 2006, the city acquired a replacement water intake
facility, a pump station placed in the Rogue 150 feet upstream from the
dam.327 The replacement water supply system made the Gold Hill Dam
obsolete and led to the city’s decision to remove the dam.328
The process of dam removal at Gold Hill proceeded in a manner similar
to that of the Sandy River dams.329 In both cases, private funding and nearunanimous support for removal produced a short time frame from the dam
removal proposal to project completion.330 In Gold Hill, the city secured
private grants to completely fund the $4 million removal costs and spent less
than one year acquiring permits from federal and state agencies331—all of
318

Id.

319

River Design Grp., Gold Hill Dam Removal, http://www.riverdesigngroup.com/projects/
dam-removal-restoration/project-gold-hill-dam-removal (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
320 KRAMER, supra note 316, at 3.
321 Id. at 6.
322 Id. at 6 n.5.
323 Id. at 6.
324 See Sanne Specht, Gold Hill’s Dam Set for Removal Next Year, MAIL TRIB., July 14, 2007,
available at http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070714/NEWS/707140311.
325 Id. (noting that around the time the dam was chosen for removal, the city of Gold Hill was
only diverting about 5 cubic feet per second (cfs) from the river).
326
327
328
329
330
331

Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
Compare supra Part IV.B.1, with infra, notes 331–35 and accompanying text.
See Chris Jones, Gold Hill Celebrates Dam Removal, KTVL NEWS 10, Jul. 16, 2008,

http://waterwatch.org/pressroom/press-clips/gold-hill-celebrates-dam-removal (last visited Nov.
18, 2012); see also Specht, supra note 324 (noting that the project received two large grants
from the Oregon Watershed Enhancement Board and that by July 2007, the project was “on the
road” to acquiring necessary permits). The Gold Hill Dam Removal Application was submitted
to the Army Corps of Engineers on December 27, 2007, and removal of the dam began in July
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which supported dam removal.332 In the Gold Hill community, few residents
opposed dam removal, mostly because the dam provided de minimis
benefits.333 The only complaints from the community had to do with
concerns about the loss of the small reservoir for recreation and the minor
costs associated with replacing irrigation lines with longer pipes to reach the
river once the channel narrowed.334 During the summer of 2008, engineers
removed the concrete structure, allowing the Rogue to flow freely through
Gold Hill for the first time in ninety years.335

3. Gold Ray Dam
Five miles upstream from the Gold Hill Dam, the Gold Ray Dam, one of
the oldest structures in the Rogue River, presented another obstacle for
migrating salmon.336 In 1905, workers completed the original Gold Ray Dam,
a structure built as a log-crib dam with a hydroelectric generator capable of
producing 750 KW.337 Hydroelectric power from Gold Ray supplied electricity
for much of the Rogue Basin throughout the first half of the twentieth
century.338 In 1941, the dam operators, Condor Water and Light Company,
constructed a replacement dam on the same site as the original log-crib
structure.339 The newly constructed concrete gravity dam,340 which retained
the name Gold Ray Dam, stood thirty-eight feet tall and continued to
generate profitable amounts of hydroelectric power serving the surrounding
area.341 Eventually, Condor Water and Light Company sold the Gold Ray Dam
to the California-Oregon Power Company, which later sold the dam
to PacifiCorp.342

2008. Jones, supra; CITY OF GOLD HILL, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS JOINT PERMIT
APPLICATION FORM (2007), available at http://digital.library.ucr.edu/cdri/documents/GoldHillDam
_RemovalApplication.pdf.
332 See Jones, supra note 331.
333
334
335

Id.
Id.
Id.

336 BILL ELLIOT & ERIC DITTMER, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE SEDIMENT STUDY CONDUCTED AT
GOLD RAY RESERVOIR, JACKSON COUNTY, OREGON, at 2 (2009), reprinted in JACKSON CNTY., GOLD
RAY DAM SEDIMENT ANALYSIS app. A (2009), available at http://rvcog.org/MN.asp?
pg=NR_Gold_Ray_Dam_Removal (under “Other Technical Reports”).
337 Ron Brown, Oregon Trails: The History of Gold Ray Dam, KDRV NEWS, Aug. 6, 2010,
http://kdrv.com/news/local/184020 (on file with the authors).
338 Dennis Powers, Gold Ray Dam, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/
entry/view/gold_ray_dam (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
339

Id.

340

A log-crib dam uses a timber frame to hold rocks and gravel in place to block the river. A
concrete gravity dam consists of concrete blocks held in place by gravity. See HEINZ CTR., DAM
REMOVAL: SCIENCE AND DECISION MAKING 26–28 (2002), available at http://water.epa.gov/
polwaste/nps/upload/Dam_removal_full_report.pdf.
341 OFFICE OF HABITAT CONSERVATION, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
FOR THE REMOVAL GOLD RAY DAM 1 (2010), available at http://rvcog.org/NR_upload/
Gold%20Ray%20Dam/Other%20Technical%20Reports/Gold%20Ray%20Dam_BA_Final_ToNMFS_
1.pdf [hereinafter GOLD RAY BA].
342 Powers, supra note 338.
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In 1972, PacifiCorp abandoned the Gold Ray Dam, allowing ownership
of the structure to revert to Jackson County.343 From the outset, Jackson
County encountered severe financial and regulatory problems associated
with maintenance of the aging dam.344 Although the dam no longer produced
hydropower, the county faced the escalating costs of repairing the dam and
replacing decades-old fish ladders that failed to meet current NMFS and
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife standards.345 Estimates placed the
removal costs of the dam at $5 million, compared to over $70 million to
refurbish the dam to generate uneconomical amounts of hydropower.346 In
addition to ordinary maintenance and fish ladder costs, concerns over the
safety of the concrete structure forced Jackson County to consider removal
as the only economically viable option.347 By 2009, the county decided to
seek federal funding to facilitate dam removal.348
In 2009, the county received a $5 million grant from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (the Obama Administration’s economic stimulus package)
and began the process of permitting the dam removal.349 Like the Gold Hill
and Sandy River dams, few local interests opposed removing the Gold Ray
Dam, largely because the dam had outlived its usefulness.350 In June 2010,
removal work began on the dam site, using a two-stage process of dam
removal similar to that implemented at Savage Rapids.351 Yet, just as work
on the removal began, some local citizens filed a lawsuit to halt the
dam’s deconstruction.352
The opponents who sued Jackson County claimed that removing the
dam violated county land-use regulations and would destroy wetlands, harm
structures of historical significance, and damage water quality.353 In July

343

GOLD RAY BA, supra note 341, at 2.

344

Id.
Id.

345
346

Scott Learn, After Dam Removals, Oregon’s Rogue River Shows Promising Signs for
OREGONIAN, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/
2010/10/early_signs_good_for_dam_remov.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (“Engineers
estimated it would take nearly $70 million to upgrade it, versus $5.6 million to take it down.”);
Mark Freeman, Prep Work on Gold Ray Dam to Resume: Land-Use Board Rejects Appeal to Halt
Removal, MAIL TRIBUNE, July 3, 2010, http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20100703/NEWS/7030317.
347 GOLD RAY BA, supra note 341, at 2.

Salmon,

348
349

Id.
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. A, 123 Stat.

115, 129 (2009); Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., NOAA Administrator
Announces Stimulus Fund Awards for Habitat Restoration in Oregon (Jul. 10, 2009),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090710_newport.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
350 See supra Part IV.B.1–2; see also Mark Freeman, Public Opinion Favors Gold Ray Dam
Removal, MAIL TRIB., Mar, 26, 2010 http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID
=/20100326/NEWS/3260325.
351 GOLD RAY BA, supra note 341, at 6.
352 See Mark Freeman, Gold Ray Dam Removal Halted: Dam Demolition May Be Delayed
More than a Month While LUBA Reviews Appeal, MAIL TRIB., June 26, 2010, http://www.
mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100626/NEWS/6260304.
353

See id.
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2010, Oregon’s Land Use Board of Appeals dismissed the case, affirming the
county’s ability to proceed as planned in removing Gold Ray Dam.354 Two
weeks after the lawsuit, deconstruction work resumed, and the engineers
completely removed the dam by the end of the summer of 2010.355 With the
completion of the Gold Ray Dam’s removal, for the first time in over 100
years the mainstem of the Rogue flowed freely from its upper reaches to the
Pacific Ocean.

4. Elk Creek Dam
The fourth major obstacle to fish migration in the Rogue Basin was a
partially completed flood control dam on Elk Creek, one of the Rogue’s
major tributaries and a significant salmon spawning stream.356 In 1955,
massive floods in the Rogue Basin led Congress to authorize a series of dams
designed to supply irrigation water, provide recreation benefits, and control
the rivers flows, thus relieving downstream concerns about flooding.357 The
Rogue River Basin flood control project proposed to build three dams under
the supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers.358 In 1977, the Corps
completed the William L. Jess Dam on Lost Creek, a tributary upstream from
the Elk Creek–Rogue confluence.359 Three years later, in 1980, workers
finished construction of the second dam, the Applegate Dam, located on a
downstream tributary of the Rogue.360 The Corps proposed to build the third
dam on Elk Creek, 1.5 miles upstream from the stream’s confluence with the
Rogue.361 In 1986, construction of the Elk Creek Dam began;362 however,
litigation and a political fight over the wisdom of damming Elk Creek soon
forced the Corps to abandon its efforts to complete the dam.363

354
355

See Shock v. Jackson Cnty., 61 Or. LUBA 403, 404 (2010); Freeman, supra note 346.
See Mark Freeman, Gold Ray Remnants Go, MAIL TRIBUNE Sept. 10, 2010,

www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100910/NEWS07/9100347/-1/NEWSMAP.
356 Oregon Wild, Elk Creek Dam, http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/elk_creek_dam (last
visited Nov. 18, 2012).
357 Camilla Mortensen, Un-Damming Elk Creek: Controversial Rogue River Dam to Make
Way for Salmon, EUGENE WEEKLY, May 15, 2008, http://www.eugeneweekly.com/
2008/05/15/news1.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
358

Id.

359

U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, LOST CREEK LAKE AND APPLEGATE LAKE, OREGON (2008),

available at http://www.nwp.usace.army.mil/Portals/24/docs/pubs/pamphlets/Applegate_Lost_
Creek.pdf.
360 OR. DEP’T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, APPLEGATE DAM PHASE I COMPLETION REPORT: EFFECTS OF
APPLEGATE DAM ON THE BIOLOGY OF ANADROMOUS SALMONIDS IN THE APPLEGATE RIVER 1 (1988),
available at http://www.dfw.state.or.us/fish/local_fisheries/rogue_river/docs/Applegate_Dam_
anadromous_salmonids_Phase_I_Completion_Report.pdf.
361 Matthew Preusch, Salmon Runs on Rogue Expected to Revive Once Dams Come Down,
OREGONIAN, June 9, 2008, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2008/06/_epic_
rogue_river_near.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
362 Oregon Wild, Elk Creek Dam Fact Sheet, http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/elk_
creek_dam/elk-creek-dam-fact-sheet (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
363 See, e.g., Mark Freeman, End of a Controversial Dam, MAIL TRIBUNE, July 16, 2008,
www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080716/NEWS/807160319/-1/NEWS19.
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Soon after the construction began, environmentalists concerned about
the effects that the dam would have on anadromous fish turned to the courts
to stop construction of the Elk Creek Dam.364 The environmental groups, led
by the Oregon Natural Resources Council, claimed that the Corps violated
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by failing to adequately
analyze the environmental effects of the dam, particularly the agency’s
failure to conduct a sufficient cumulative impacts analysis, mitigate the
environmental impacts, supplement the dam’s EIS, and conduct a “worst
case analysis” of potential but uncertain effects.365 In Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh,366 the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
environmentalists, concluding that the Corps’ environmental analysis
violated NEPA and issued an injunction barring the Corps from completing
the dam until it adequately analyzed the dam’s potential environmental
effects.367 However, in 1989, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
determining that the Corps’ analysis satisfied NEPA because the Corps was
not required to conduct a supplemental EIS, the agency fulfilled NEPA’s
mitigation requirements, and the statute did not require agencies to consider
a worst-case scenario.368
Although the Supreme Court validated part of the Corps’ NEPA analysis
in Marsh, the Elk Creek Dam never was completed.369 Between 1992 and
1995, the USFS, BLM, and NMFS each concluded that the Elk Creek Dam
would unreasonably damage wild anadromous fish populations in the Rogue
Basin.370 In 1994, the federal court for the District of Oregon renewed the
injunction prohibiting further dam construction and required the Corps to
conduct a new analysis considering the effects of the dam on the Rogue’s
fishery,371 a decision that was upheld by the Ninth Circuit.372 In 1995, the

364 See James J. Wesser, Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh: The Ninth Circuit
Establishes a Potent Standard for Environmental Disclosure, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 153,

154–55 (1988).
365 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 628 F. Supp. 1557, 1562–63 (D. Or. 1986), rev’d, 820
F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987).
366 820 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 360 (1989).
367 Id. at 1055–62.
368 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 369–70, 385 (1989). See Marion D. Miller,
The National Environmental Policy Act and Judicial Review After Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council and Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 223, 248
(1991); Wendy B. Davis, The Fox Is Guarding the Henhouse: Enhancing the Role of the EPA in
FONSI Determinations Pursuant to NEPA, 39 AKRON L. REV. 35, 57–58 (2006).
369 The Corps did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that it failed to conduct an
adequate cumulative impacts analysis; thus, even though the Corps won every issue brought to
the Supreme Court, the injunction against the dam’s completion remained in effect. Or. Natural
Res. Council v. Marsh, 845 F. Supp. at 763 (D. Or. 1994); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490
U.S. at 363. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Operations: Elk Creek, http://www.nwp.
usace.army.mil/Locations/RogueRiverBasin/ElkCreek.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
370 See Oregon Wild, Elk Creek Dam Timeline, http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/elk_
creek_dam/elk-creek-dam-timeline (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
371 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 845 F.Supp. 758, 763–64 (D. Or. 1994) (relying on the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to conclude that the Corps must consider downstream effects to
anadromous fish).
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Corps determined that the financial costs of legal challenges, environmental
studies, necessary fish passage facilities, and continued construction
outweighed the potential gains of the dam.373 Consequently, the agency
abandoned the Elk Creek Dam project, leaving one-third of the eighty-threefoot structure blocking the stream channel—preventing fish passage in Elk
Creek and providing no economic or flood control benefits to the
human community.374
Once the Corps decided not to complete the dam, a political
controversy erupted over the future of the partially finished dam that
continued to hinder the recovery of threatened salmon species.375 Like the
political debate over funding for dam removals on the Elwha River, the
controversy over the future of the Elk Creek Dam featured two conflicting
views and passionate advocates arguing for and against dam removal.376 On
one side of the debate, a few powerful political figures opposed removing
the dam, preferring instead that the Corps maintain the structure to preserve
the possibility of finishing the dam in the future.377 On the other side, a
coalition of organizations and government agencies championed dam
removal to promote anadromous fish recovery and serve the public interest
by restoring the natural flow of the river.378 Toward the end of a fourteenyear debate,379 a key political figure who had opposed dam removal, U.S.
Representative Greg Walden of Oregon, notified the Corps that any efforts to
remove or notch380 Elk Creek Dam would not be funded by Congress, and
that the Corps should continue its existing salmon transportation plan,
which consisted of trapping salmon below the dam and trucking the fish
above the dam.381 Congressman Walden’s opposition to dam removal
culminated in a 2003 spending bill rider that prevented the Corps from
implementing the dam notching plans.382
Ultimately, Congressman Walden and the dam removal opponents
could not match the overwhelming public and scientific support in favor of
removing or notching Elk Creek Dam.383 Since the early 1990s, NMFS

372 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d at 1490 (9th Cir. 1995); see Elk Creek Dam
Timeline, supra note 370.
373 See Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370.
374 See Oregon Wild, supra note 356; Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370.
375 See Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370. NMFS added the Rogue’s coho salmon to

the ESA list of threatened species in 1997. Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened
Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU) of
Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,588–89 (May 6, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227).
376 Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370; see also supra Part II.B.2.
377 See Mortensen, supra note 357.
378 See Oregon Wild, supra note 356.
379 The political controversy lasted from about 1994 to 2008. See Elk Creek Dam Timeline,
supra note 370.
380 See Nat’l Park Serv., supra note 113 (explaining the concept of “notching” a dam).
381 See Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, EVALUATION OF
THE EFFECTS OF ELK CREEK DAM ON MIGRATORY SALMONIDS 3 (2007) (describing the collection
and transportation methods for moving salmonids around the dam).
382 See Elk Creek Dam Timeline, supra note 370.
383 See id.; Oregon Wild, supra note 356.
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expressed concerns that the dam failed to provide effective fish passage, and
that no other more effective techniques, such as fish ladders, promised to
redress the issue of fish passage at Elk Creek Dam.384 The Corps eventually
agreed with NMFS, concluding that notching the dam would be the least
expensive means of addressing the fish passage issue.385 Elk Creek
historically provided a significant amount of the Rogue Basin’s spawning
habitat, accounting for 44% of upper Rogue coho spawning habitat and 15%
to 20% of upper Rogue steelhead spawning habitat.386 In 2001, a NMFS BiOp
concluded that unless the Corps notched Elk Creek to allow for fish passage,
coho salmon, a listed threatened species, would be jeopardized.387
With the scientific debate over the merits of notching settled, advocates
for river restoration increased pressure on Congress to notch Elk Creek
Dam.388 In 2002, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber urged the Corps to notch
the dam in order to boost economic value of the Rogue’s fishery and recover
coho stocks.389 Other groups pointed out the expense and inefficiencies of
the Corps’ fish transportation plan—both Taxpayers for Common Sense and
environmental groups called the plan a waste of taxpayer’s money and urged
Congress to force the Corps to notch the dam.390
In 2007, the Corps finally acquiesced and released a plan to notch Elk
Creek Dam by demolishing the middle section of the structure, allowing the
stream to run through a reclaimed channel.391 Beginning in July 2008, nine
controlled blasts destroyed the concrete sections of the dam in the middle of
the creek.392 During the summer of 2008, the Corps provided re-vegetation,
stream bank stabilization, and stream channel reclamation along a portion of
Elk Creek.393 Engineers cleared concrete from the streambed, but left the
concrete remnants of the unfinished dam on either side of the stream,
framing the river as it flows through the former dam site.394

384
385
386
387

Elk Creek Dam Fact Sheet, supra note 362.
Oregon Wild, supra note 356.
Elk Creek Dam Fact Sheet, supra note 362.
Margaret B. Bowman, Legal Perspectives on Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 739,

741 (2002).
388

See Elk Creek Dam Fact Sheet, supra note 362.

389

Letter from John Kitzhaber, Governor, Oregon, to U.S. Representatives C.W.
Bill Young and David R. Obey, House Committee on Appropriations (Aug. 27, 2002),
available at http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/elk_creek_dam/elk-creek-dam-backgrounddocuments/oregon-governor-john-kitzhaber-s-letter-to-congress-on-elk-creek-dam-8-27-02.
390 Letter from American Rivers, Taxpayers for Common Sense (and other environmental
groups), to U.S. Representatives C.W. Bill Young and David R. Obey, House Committee on
Appropriations (Aug. 20, 2002), republished at: http://www.oregonwild.org/waters/
elk_creek_dam/elk-creek-dam-background-documents/american-rivers-taxpayers-for-commonsense-and-others-letter-to-house-appropriations-committee-of-august-20-2002.
391 Elk Creek Dam Fact Sheet, supra note 362.
392
393
394

Id.
Id.
See WaterWatch, Notching the Elk Creek Dam, http://waterwatch.org/programs/freeing-

the-rogue-river/notching-the-elk-creek-dam (last visited Nov. 18, 2012)
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B. Restoring the Rogue River
Almost immediately after the removal of the three mainstem Rogue
dams, the river’s salmon fishery showed signs of recovery.395 In 2010,
biologists found thirty-one redds—small nests dug by fish in stream beds
for egg laying—in the Rogue where the Gold Ray reservoir once stood, and
sixty-three in the former Savage Rapids reservoir.396 With the continuation
of river restoration projects, including streambank stabilization throughout
the basin, biologists and fishermen are optimistic that salmon populations
will rebound.397
VI. THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: LOOKING AHEAD
TO FUTURE DAM REMOVALS
To the south of the Rogue Basin, the Klamath River flows from its
headwaters in the Cascade Range near Klamath Falls, Oregon, for over 263
miles to its mouth at the Pacific Ocean in northern California.398 The Klamath
carves a course through two distinct geographic areas—the dry, high desert
of southern Oregon, where water derives primarily from spring snowmelt,399
and the wet, temperate clime of northern California, where rainfall and
numerous tributaries400 increase the river’s discharge.401 Historically one of
the most biologically productive streams in the Pacific Northwest, the
Klamath yielded abundant runs of anadromous fish, averaging 880,000
spawning salmon per year.402 For over 4,500 years, the Klamath Tribes403 have
relied on the river’s salmon and sucker fish as staple food sources and pillars
of their cultural identity.404 Unfortunately, hydroelectric dams, irrigation
projects, and recent droughts nearly destroyed the Klamath’s wild salmon
395
396
397
398

See Learn, supra note 271, at 1.
Id. at A8.
See id.
See KYNA POWERS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33098, KLAMATH RIVER BASIN ISSUES

AND ACTIVITIES: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2005).
399 See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock,

Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the
Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 289 (2003). The Iron Gate Dam at river mile 190 serves as
the general dividing point for basin’s two geographic regions. See COMM. ON HYDROLOGY,

ECOLOGY, AND FISHES OF THE KLAMATH RIVER, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HYDROLOGY, ECOLOGY,
FISHES OF THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 26 (2008), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook/
12072/png/26.png.
400 The lower Klamath River’s principle tributaries include the Trinity, Shasta, Scott, and
Salmon Rivers. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., KLAMATH RIVER BASIN, 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS
2 (2009).
401 See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 399. The Klamath River Basin covers an area of over
12,100 square miles. POWERS ET AL., supra note 398.
402 Glen Spain, Dams, Water Reforms, and Endangered Species in the Klamath Basin, 22 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 49, 51 (2007).
403 The Klamath Tribes include the Klamath, Modocs, and Yahooskin peoples of the upper
basin, as well as the Karuk and Yurok tribes of the lower basin. Daniel McCool, Rivers
of the Homeland: River Restoration on Indian Reservations, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539,
549–50 (2007).
404 See id. at 552.
AND
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population; current salmon runs number only about 6% of historic levels.405
Throughout most of its modern history, controversy and political strife have
dominated the Klamath Basin, including conflicts over virtually every major
western water issue—dams, water rights, and endangered species.406

A. Setting the Stage for the Klamath Controversy
Non-native settlement and population growth in the Klamath Basin
began in the middle of the nineteenth century as miners and pioneers
flocked to the resource-rich area pursuing gold, timber, and farmland.407 In
1905, the Bureau of Reclamation authorized the construction of
hydroelectric dams and irrigation canals throughout the basin, which
eventually supplied electricity and water to over 200,000 acres of arid
farmland in Oregon and California.408 Currently, the mainstem of the Klamath
River contains five dams, including four hydroelectric dams, owned and
operated by PacifiCorp as part of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.409 The
combined effects of dams and irrigation, however, blocked the Klamath to
salmon migration and reduced water flows, destroying fish spawning habitat
and leaving the once-abundant salmon in danger of extinction.410

1. Dam Building for Power
In 1913, construction began on the first in a series of dams planned as
part of an ambitious hydroelectric project on the mainstem of the Klamath
River.411 The California Oregon Electric Company (COPCO) initiated the
Klamath Hydroelectric Project by building two concrete arch hydroelectric

405 Spain, supra note 402, at 52; see also Robert A. McFarlane, Note, The Imperiled Klamath
River Salmon: A Troubled History and A Hopeful Future Under the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act, 1 HASTINGS W.-NW J. OF ENVTL. L., POL’Y, 89, 92–93 (1994) (recognizing that in

1992, the number of salmon returning to spawn in the Klamath Basin reached an all-time low
of 25,900).
406 See McCool, supra note 403, at 549 (noting that the “Klamath Basin has become famous
for conflict”) (citation omitted).
407 See Mark Clark & Earl D. Miller, Notes on Early Water Use in the Klamath Basin, 13 J.
SHAW HIST. LIBR. 19, at 20–21 (1999).
408 Matthew G. McHenry, Comment, The Worst of Times: A Tale of Two Fishes in the
Klamath Basin, 33 ENVTL. L. 1019, 1024 (2003). The Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371–
498, directed the Bureau of Reclamation to aid western development by funding irrigation
projects and other public works in arid regions. Id. at 1022–23; Clark & Miller, supra note 407, at
23; Davidson, supra note 22 at 533–35.
409 The five main stem dams are the Keno, J.C. Boyle, Copco No.1, Copco No.2, and the Iron
Gate Dams. In addition, the Klamath Basin contains two dams on tributary streams: the Link
River Dam and Fall Creek Dams. See David N. Allen, The Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement
Agreement: Federal Law, Local Compromise, and the Largest Dam Removal Project in History,
16 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 427, 431, 443–44, (2010).
410 See Chang-Hee Christine Bae, Salmon Protection in the Pacific Northwest: Can it
Succeed? 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 559, 561–62, 566–69 (2008).
411 See GEORGE KRAMER, KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (FERC NO. 2082) HISTORIC
CONTEXT STATEMENT 40 (2003), available at http://act.americanrivers.org/site/DocServer/Kramer
_2003_FLA_E6_Appendix_E-6D_Historic_Context_1.pdf.
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dams in Ward’s Canyon, 198 miles upstream from the Klamath’s mouth.412
Five years after construction began, COPCO completed the first structure,
Copco No. 1, a massive 120-foot dam that generated 20 MW of electricity.413
In 1925, engineers completed the second dam, Copco No. 2, which stood
twenty-one feet tall at a quarter mile downstream from Copco No. 1.414
Together the two dams generated 47 MW of electricity and completely
blocked salmon access to seventy-five miles of the upper Klamath River.415
As farms grew and more fields required irrigation, an increasing
demand for electricity led to the expansion of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project.416 In 1958, workers completed the Big Bend Dam, later renamed the
J.C. Boyle Dam, twenty-five miles upstream from the Copco Dams.417
The sixty-eight-foot earthen-fill dam generated 80 MW of electricity for
COPCO’s power customers in the Klamath Basin.418 Because the construction
of the J.C. Boyle Dam occurred after the Federal Water Power Act of 1935,
COPCO required a permit for construction and operation of the dam.419
In 1954, COPCO received a fifty-year license for the J.C. Boyle Dam, which
was later transferred to PacifiCorp after the two companies merged in
1961—the same year PacifiCorp took over management of the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project.420
In 1959, the California Fish and Game Department and the downstream
Klamath fishing industry threatened to sue PacifiCorp over the wildly
fluctuating water releases from the Copco and J.C. Boyles Dams.421
PacifiCorp generated power from the three dams by releasing stored water
from the reservoirs at times of high electricity demand.422 This produced
drastically varying downstream river levels that harmed fish and water
quality in the lower Klamath.423 In order to avert the lawsuit and better
regulate flows on the Klamath, Pacificorp agreed to build a new dam

412 See id. at 39–44; G&G ASSOCS., KLAMATH RIVER DAM REMOVAL INVESTIGATION 3 (2003),
available
at
http://ucblibrary4.berkeley.edu/wrca/damremoval/documents/Gathart_dam_

removal_report.pdf.
413 See KRAMER, supra note 411; G&G ASSOCS., supra note 412.
414 G&G ASSOCS., supra note 412.
415 See OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL EIS:
RELICENSING OF THE KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT NO. 2082-027, at 2-8 to -11 (2007),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2007/11-16-07.asp (click on
“Section 2”) [hereinafter KLAMATH EIS]; Klamath Forest Alliance, Klamath River, http://www.
klamathforestalliance.org/Issuesdatabase/klamathriver.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
416 See Clark & Miller, supra note 407, at 20–24.
417 See PACIFICORP, EXHIBIT C: CONSTRUCTION HISTORY AND PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION,
KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (FERC PROJECT NO. 2082), at 4-1 (2004); G&G ASSOCS.,
supra note 412.
418 See PACIFICORP, supra note 417.
419 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 800. See Klamath Off-Project Water Users, Inc. v. PacifiCorp, 240 P.3d
94, 96 (Or. App. 2010).
420 See Klamath Off-Project Water Users, 240 P.3d, at 96–97.
421 See HOLLY D. DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO
LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 79 (2008) [hereinafter WATER WAR].
422
423

Id.
Id.
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downstream from the Copco Dam.424 In 1962, PacifiCorp completed the
massive Iron Gate Dam, which stood 173 feet tall, was composed of rock and
gravel fill materials, and generated 18 MW of electricity.425
After completion of the Iron Gate Dam, the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project consisted of four hydroelectric dams, with a rated capacity of 169
MW.426 Currently, the four dams produce closer to 81 MW,427 supplying power
to over 1,400 farms and about 70,000 homes throughout the Klamath Basin.428
With no fish passage facilities at the three downstream dams—Iron Gate and
Copco Nos. 1 and 2—the Klamath Hydroelectric Project completely blocked
migratory fish access to 300 miles of the upper Klamath River and its
tributary streams.429

2. Irrigating the Upper Klamath Basin
Coinciding with the start of dam construction on the Klamath, the
Bureau of Reclamation began a massive irrigation project to drain
marshlands and deliver water from the Klamath River to farms in the upper
basin.430 In 1905, the Bureau began constructing water storage dams,
reservoirs, and over 185 miles of canals—all part of the Klamath Irrigation
Project.431 The federal government’s policy of transforming the arid upper
Klamath Basin into productive farmland through subsidized irrigation gained
further momentum in 1917 when the government opened public lands to
homesteaders who paid only a small fee in exchange for the delivery of
irrigation water.432
With a continuously growing population and demand for water, the
federal government enacted the Klamath River Basin Compact to govern the
orderly development of the basin.433 The 1957 Compact prioritized irrigation

424

Id.
See WATER WAR, supra note 421; G&G ASSOCS., supra note 412, at 18.
426 See Allen, supra note 409, at 444. Until 2006, PacifiCorp contracted with the Bureau of
Reclamation to operate two government dams. Id. at 444 n.130. The Link River and Keno Dams
425

are primarily flow-regulating dams located near the Klamath’s headwaters at river miles 254 and
233, respectively. A 22-mile reservoir formed behind the Keno Dam supplies water to 41% of
lands irrigated by the Klamath Irrigation Project. Id. at 444 n.132. The contract between
PacifiCorp and the Bureau of Reclamation required the Klamath’s flows to be regulated to
ensure the availability of irrigation water in the reservoir. Id. The Link River Dam also supplies
water to two powerhouses, the Eastside and Westside Powerhouses, id. at 444, which have a
combined generating capacity of 3.8 MW and are technically part of the Klamath Hydroelectric
Project. Id. at 444 n.131.
427 See Allen, supra note 409, at 444.
428 ANNA LEON-GUERRO, SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COMMUNITY, POLICY, AND SOCIAL ACTION 373
(2010); PACIFICORP, KLAMATH SETTLEMENT OVERVIEW 2 (2011), available at http://www.
oregon.gov/energy/RENEW/Geothermal/docs/5-OGWG-Pacificorp.pdf.
429 The J.C. Boyle Dam received upstream and downstream fish passage facilities; however,
the Klamath Hydroelectric Project combined with the Keno and Link River Dams blocked 570
miles of the Klamath and its tributaries to fish migration. See Allen, supra note 409, at 445.
430 See Davidson, supra note 22, at 533–34.
431 Id. at 534–35.
432 Id. at 535.
433 See Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 85-222, art. I, 71 Stat. 497 (1957).
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over all water uses in the basin other than domestic use, including instream
flows for fish and wildlife.434 By 2001, the Klamath Irrigation Project supplied
water to over 200,000 acres of farmland,435 but human population growth and
water users have long exceeded the capacity of the Klamath to supply
enough water for all of the farmlands, let alone leaving water in the river to
sustain the ecosystem.436
The economic dependence of farmers on irrigation water has led to
serious fights over water appropriations in the basin.437 In 2001, a severe
drought left the Klamath Basin, an already dry region, especially desperate
for water.438 The Bureau implemented an operations plan for the Klamath
Irrigation Project that re-prioritized water deliveries, leaving water in the
river for ESA-listed fish and tribal water rights,439 but shutting off water
deliveries to upper Klamath irrigators—a move that elevated the water
conflict into a furor.440 After losing a lawsuit attempting to enjoin the Bureau
from implementing the operations plan,441 the Klamath Irrigation District, an
organization of irrigators, sued the federal government for $1 billion in lost
revenue to farms as a result of the irrigation shut-off.442
Another front in the Klamath water war occurred at the convergence of
hydropower and irrigation. Since 1917, a clause in PacifiCorp’s FERC license
for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project allowed irrigators to receive
electricity for irrigation pumps from the hydroelectric dams at one-twelfth to
one-seventeenth the market price.443 In 2006, the states of Oregon and
California ordered a decoupling of the favorable rates and a return to market
prices phased in over a seven- and four-year transition period, respectively.444
434 See Davidson, supra note 22, at 536. Water conservation was one of the stated goals of
the Compact, a goal that seems to have been lost between Washington, D.C. and Oregon.
Klamath River Basin Compact, art. I(a), 71 Stat. at 497.
435 See Davidson, supra note 22, at 536.
436 See Spain, supra note 402, at 93–94. The Oregon Water Resources Department still issues
water rights in the Klamath Basin even though the basin has been over-appropriated for years.
Id. Irrigators have begun pumping groundwater to fill their demands for water, resulting in
groundwater depletion that has exacerbated the conflict in the Klamath. Id. at 94.
437 See Jeff Barnard, Fight Over Water in Klamath Basin is Symbol of West, SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1996, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19961201&slug=
2362598 (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). The late-1970s drought was aptly named the “Klamath
Salmon War” because of the conflicts between irrigators and the fishing industry and tribes. See
McFarlane, supra note 405, at 92.
438 See Davidson, supra note 22, at 543–44.
439 See McHenry, supra note 408, at 1045–46.
440 In 2001, the Klamath water conflict nearly deteriorated into violence when farmers staged
a protest to release water from irrigation headgates. See Davidson, supra note 22, at 545. U.S.
Marshals were called to Klamath Falls, Oregon, because local police refused to arrest the
farmers. See Bruce Barcott, What’s A River For? MOTHER JONES, May/June 2003,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/05/whats-river.
441 See Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200–02 (D. Or. 2001) (denying the
irrigators’ injunction request); McHenry, supra note 408, at 1027.
442 See Spain, supra note 402, at 77–78 (discussing Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed.
Cl. 504, 526–27 (2005), vacated and remanded, Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505
(Fed. Cir. 2011)).
443 See id. 113–14.
444 See id. at 115.
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Although an association of Klamath irrigators continues to challenge the
states’ decision to decouple,445 the elimination of below-market power rates
removed the principal economic interest irrigators had in maintaining the
Klamath’s hydroelectric dams.446

3. Tribal Water Rights and the Disappearing Salmon
For almost a century, the interests of hydropower and irrigators took
precedence in the Klamath Basin, subjugating tribal and environmental
water usage, and at times leaving not even a single drop of water in the
river.447 In 1864, the Klamath Tribes signed a treaty with the federal
government guaranteeing tribal fishing rights in historic fishing grounds of
the basin.448 The Bureau of Reclamation and Oregon’s Water Resources
Department, however, paid little attention to the tribes’ reserved fishing
rights until 1983, when the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Bureau’s irrigation
project must leave enough water in the Klamath to ensure fishing capacity.449
The Ninth Circuit elevated consideration of tribal water interests above
irrigators, concluding that the tribes’ water priority date extended to time
immemorial and recognizing the tribes’ water rights as the most senior in
the basin.450
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized the tribes’ senior water rights,
the historic Klamath water conflict descended into a “wicked” natural
resource problem with the interjection of the Endangered Species Act.451
Because the hydroelectric dams blocked migrating fish access to upstream
spawning grounds, and because irrigators pumped massive amounts of
water out of the river and tributaries, the native fish species of the Klamath
entered a precipitous decline.452 In 1988, the Fish and Wildlife Service listed
two upstream fish, the Lost River sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and short-nose
sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris), as endangered species.453
The ESA’s requirement that federal agencies consider and protect the
listed sucker fish forced the Bureau to store more water in upper basin
reservoirs, keeping higher upstream water levels and improving sucker fish

445 See id. at 115–16 (discussing Klamath Off-Project Water Users, Inc. v. PacifiCorp, 240
P.3d 94, 96 (Or. App. 2010) in which the court summarily dismissed the irrigators’ claims).
446 Id. at 113. None of the hydroelectric dams provide water storage directly for the Klamath
Irrigation Project, as the irrigation diversions all occur well upstream from the dams. Id. at 101.
447 See McFarlane, supra note 405, at 94.
448 See Davidson, supra note 422, at 541.
449 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1413–14 (9th Cir. 1983); Spain, supra note 402,
at 92–93.
450 See Spain, supra note 402, at 92.
451 See Martin Nie, Drivers of Natural Resource-Based Political Conflict, 36 POL’Y SCI. 307,
310 (2003) (describing “wicked” natural resource problems as exhibiting four characteristics: 1)
defining the problem is a problem, 2) having no clear point when the problem can be deemed
solved, 3) eluding yes/no policy questions and objective evaluations, 4) consisting of a pattern
where every sub-problem is a symptom of another problem.)
452 See Spain, supra note 402, at 52.
453 See Determination of Endangered Status for the Shortnose Sucker and Lost River Sucker,
53 Fed. Reg. 27,130 (July 18, 1988) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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habitat.454 But the maintenance of Klamath water upstream, combined with
severe droughts in the early 1990s, proved catastrophic for other struggling
native species.455 In 1997, the NMFS listed coho salmon as a threatened
species, in large part due to the poor water quality and inadequate
downstream Klamath flows that prevented the salmon from migrating
upstream to spawning habitat.456 Between September 20 and 27, 2002, over
30,000 fish died in the lower Klamath due to toxic water conditions and low
flows—an event that was one of the largest salmon-kills ever.457 The loss of
wild salmon in the Klamath also resulted in economic hardship for the
northern California and Oregon fishing industry, which lost over $100 million
in revenue due to fishing closures in 2006 alone.458
In order to fulfill their obligations under the ESA to protect upstream
and downstream fish habitat, the Bureau’s 2001 Operations Plan
reprioritized water deliveries in the basin.459 The plan directed the Bureau to
leave enough water in the Klamath to ensure habitat for upstream sucker
fishes and downstream salmon, and fulfill tribal water and fishing rights
before supplying irrigators.460 In a decision cursed by farmers, the federal
district court upheld the Operations Plan, noting that the ESA functioned as
a trump card in natural resource management.461 According to the court, the
Bureau had a legal duty to leave enough water in the Klamath to avoid
jeopardy to listed species and to fulfill tribal water rights, even if doing so
meant causing economic harm to irrigators.462

B. Dam Removal and the Klamath Basin Agreements
The severe decline and subsequent ESA listing of wild fish in the
Klamath eventually led to calls from environmentalists, the Klamath Tribes,
and the fishing industry to remove the hydroelectric dams and restore the
Klamath’s abundant fishery.463 The campaign for dam removal accelerated in
2004 when the Klamath Hydroelectric Project’s fifty-year FERC license was

454
455
456

See Spain, supra note 402, at 58.
See id. at 52.
See Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily

Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,588, 24,592–93, 24,609 (May 6,
1997) (codified as amended at 50 C.F.R. § 223.102).
457 See Thomas P. Schlosser, Dewatering Trust Responsibility: The New Klamath River
Hydroelectric and Restoration Agreements, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 42, 61 (2011).
458 See Spain, supra note 402, at 98; see also Perspectives on California’s Water Supply:
Challenges and Opportunities; Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Water and Power, 111th
Cong. (2010) (statement of Larry Collins, President, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns),
republished at: www.pcffa.org/fn-apr10.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
459 See McHenry, supra note 408, at 1045.
460
461

See id.
See Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1207 (D. Or. 2001); see also Spain,

supra note 402, at 58.
462 See Kandra, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1207 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
(1978), for the proposition that “the ESA requires an agency to avoid jeopardy to species,
‘whatever the cost’”).
463 See Allen, supra note 409, at 446.
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set to expire.464 By 2010, the major interest groups in the Klamath Basin
signed two agreements proposing major changes to water resource
management in the basin and aiming to remove PacifiCorp’s four
hydroelectric dams by 2020.465

1. The Relicensing Process
In 2004, PacifiCorp began the process of renewing its FERC license for
the continued operation of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.466 For the next
two years, federal agencies studied the environmental and economic effects
of relicensing the Klamath dams.467 Under the Federal Power Act, FWS and
NMFS submitted joint comments, including mandatory prescriptions for
FERC to include in the renewed license.468 FWS and NMFS prescribed new
fish ladders, fish screens, and improved spillways at all four dams.469 The
Department of the Interior also submitted comments recommending that
FERC require minimum flows from the J.C. Boyle Dam, minimum water
levels in the Keno reservoir, and streamflow monitoring throughout the
reach of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.470
In its final EIS released in 2007, FERC concluded that the required
modifications and improvements to the hydroelectric dams would cost more
than the likely revenue from maintaining the dams, making relicensing the
entire Klamath Hydroelectric Project uneconomical.471 As a result of this
conclusion, and due to the reluctance of Oregon and California to provide
certifications under section 401 of the Clean Water Act without substantial
improvements to the Klamath’s water quality,472 PacifiCorp turned to the
negotiating table, seeking a settlement with key stakeholders.473 The
resulting negotiations produced two major agreements addressing water
allocation and hydropower conflicts in the Klamath Basin.474

2. The Agreements
In February 2010, approximately twenty parties475 signed the Klamath
Basin Restoration Agreement—a major proposal to resolve water allocation

464

See id. at 446–47.
See id. at 451–52.
466 Id. at 446–47.
467 See id. at 447.
468 See id. Recall that under the FPA, FWS and NMFS may submit mandatory prescriptions
that FERC must include in the license. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 811 (2006); Blumm &
Nadol, supra note 153, at 85.
465

469 PacifiCorp challenged the fishway prescriptions, but an administrative law judge ruled in
favor of the FWS and NMFS prescriptions. See Klamath Hydroelectric Project, No. 2006-NMFS0001, at 6 (NOAA Fisheries Sept. 27, 2006).
470 See Allen, supra note 409, at 449.
471 See id.; KLAMATH EIS, supra note 415, at 4-4, 4-6 tbl.4-4.
472 See Allen, supra note 409, at 449–450.
473 See id. at 451.
474 See Schlosser, supra note 457, at 44–45.
475 See id. at 44. PacifiCorp was not a party to the Restoration Agreement.
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and fishery issues in the Basin.476 The Restoration Agreement contained
three broad goals for future water allocation in the Klamath: 1) restoring and
sustaining fish populations to support an economic harvest; 2) providing
water and power for agriculture, domestic use, and wildlife; and 3)
promoting sustainability, including mitigating effects of future dam
removals.477 The Restoration Agreement called for the creation of the
Klamath Basin Coordinating Council, which would oversee $1 billion in
federal spending over ten years on water improvement projects, including
$900 million for fish restoration.478 Although the Restoration Agreement has
been roundly criticized on all fronts,479 perhaps its most controversial
provision is the one that tied that agreement to the implementation of the
second agreement, the Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement.480
Thus, signatories pinned the fate of a crucial Klamath water allocation
agreement on the implementation of the largest dam removal project ever
proposed.481 In 2011, Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Or.) introduced a bill in
Congress to approve the Restoration Agreement and authorize
appropriations for water improvement projects.482 But so far this bill has not
gained much political traction, and even Senator Merkley admitted that the
debate is going to continue and the issue is far from settled.483
During the signing ceremony of the Restoration Agreement in February
2010, twenty organizations consented to the Hydroelectric Agreement—a
framework for decommissioning the Klamath Hydroelectric Project.484
Within this novel proposal, PacifiCorp and the federal government agreed to
continue studying the possibility of removing the four Klamath hydroelectric
dams.485 If the federal government proceeds with dam removal, PacifiCorp

476
477
478

See id.
See Allen, supra note 409, at 453.
See id. at 453–54. The Restoration Agreement requires Congress to approve an additional

$400 million appropriation and authorize federal agencies in the Klamath to redirect $600
million in existing funds over the next 10 years. Id.
479 See Schlosser, supra note 457, at 43 (criticizing the agreements for their abandonment of
tribal fishing and water rights); John Devoe, Merkley’s Proposal Unscientific and Unsustainable,
OREGONIAN, Dec. 10, 2011, at B7 (discussing the views of WaterWatch of Oregon, an
environmental group that does not support the agreements because of the costs they impose
and their failure to protect instream flows for fish).
480 See Bill Cross, Harm from Dams Far Outweighs Kilowatts Produced, OREGONIAN, Dec. 3,
2011, at B9 (suggesting the issue of dam removal should be discussed as an economic problem:
the value of the electricity generated versus the environmental benefits of dam removal).
481 See Allen, supra note 409, at 451, Peter Fimrite, Deal to Raze 4 Klamath Dams, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Deal-to-raze-4-Klamath-dams3215111.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
482 Klamath Basin Economic Restoration Act of 2011, S. 1851, 112th Cong. §§ 101, 104; see
Charles Pope & Scott Learn, Klamath Basin Water Bill Is Landmark, But Will It Pass Congress?,
OREGONIAN, Nov. 10, 2011, at A1.
483 See Samantha Tipler, Water Issues Dominate Merkley Town Hall, HERALD & NEWS,
Apr. 5, 2012, republished at: http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/settlement/articles2012/
wtrissuesdominateMerkley040512.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
484 See Schlosser, supra note 457, at 45.
485 See Allen, supra note 409 at 457.
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will transfer title to the four dams486 to a designated dam removal entity,487
which will be responsible for planning and implementing dam removal and
river restoration beginning in 2020.488
Under the Hydroelectric Agreement, PacifiCorp ratepayers and Oregon
and California taxpayers would pay all of the removal costs up to $450
million.489 In July 2009, Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski signed into law S.B.
76, a bill that increased rates for PacifiCorp’s Oregon customers in order to
raise $184 million by 2020.490 Subsequently, California’s Public Utility
Commission approved a rate increase for northern California PacifiCorp
customers in order to raise an additional $16 million for the Klamath dam
removal.491 As part of the Hydroelectric Agreement, the state of California
agreed to provide an additional $250 million for removal through bonds.492 If
the costs of dam removal exceed $450 million, the Hydroelectric Agreement
releases California, Oregon, and PacifiCorp from further liability, 493
placing the burden of potential excess costs on the federal government or
private contributions.
Although the Hydroelectric Agreement established the framework for
dam removal, the signatories left the ultimate decision of whether to pursue
complete dam removal in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior.494 The
agreement called for the Secretary to continue studying dam removal and to
make a formal determination on whether to move ahead with the plan.495
After the determination, the project could proceed only if Congress enacted
legislation approving the plan, and if the following conditions were also met:
1) the Secretary and PacifiCorp agreed on a transfer of titles to the dams, 2)
the states authorized funding for removal (and the Secretary established a
plan to cover excess costs), and 3) the Secretary identified a willing dam
removal entity.496
The established timeline for removal beginning in 2020 under the
Hydroelectric Agreement allows PacifiCorp to operate the Klamath
Hydroelectric Project in the interim.497 Currently, the four hydroelectric
dams continue to operate under year-to-year FERC licenses,498 and

486 See id. at 451, 454. PacifiCorp would be shielded from liability after the voluntary
transfer. Id. at 459.
487 See id. at 463. The dam removal entity would be responsible for acquiring the necessary
permits and certifications necessary for dam removal. Id.
488 See id. at 464.
489 Id. at 459; see Allison Winter, Interior Analysis Weighs Klamath Dam Removal, But Hill
Action Lags, NATURAL RES. WEEKLY REPORT, E&E NEWS, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.eenews.net/
Landletter/print/2012/02/02/10 (estimating total costs for removal of the four hydroelectric dams
at $238–$493 million).
490 See Allen, supra note 409, at 459–60; S. 76, 75th Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).
491 See Allen, supra note 409, at 460.
492
493
494
495
496
497
498

See id.
See id. at 459.
See id. at 457.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 465.
See id.
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PacifiCorp’s yearly revenues from the project are estimated at $27 million.499
The Settlement Agreement also requires PacifiCorp to implement temporary
measures for improving fish passage and water quality, including spending
$510,000 per year on salmon recovery efforts,500 less than 2% of the annual
revenues produced by the project.

C. Factors Affecting Dam Removal: Lessons for the Klamath
Two years after the signing ceremony, the future of the Restoration
and Hydroelectric Agreements remains anything but certain. Senator
Merkley’s efforts to approve and appropriate funding for the agreements in
Congress have stalled.501 In February 2012, Secretary Salazar announced
that he would delay indefinitely a determination on dam removal because
the Department of the Interior lacked authority to take title of the dams
and carry out their removal absent congressional action.502 Despite the
novel and ambitious plan to resolve the controversies over dams, water
allocation, and ESA-listed species in a holistic way, the agreements have
drawn sharp criticism from both sides—further galvanizing a region
accustomed to disagreement.503 In May 2012, the Hoopa Tribe of the lower
Klamath advocated abandoning the agreements and returning the damremoval decision to the FERC relicensing process.504
Unlike the examples of the Elwha,505 White Salmon,506 Sandy,507 and
Rogue Rivers,508 the Klamath dams509 stand at the center of a dense and
complex web of interest groups and political conflict. But the lessons
learned from successful dam removals in other parts of the Pacific
Northwest shed some light on the factors affecting dam removal in the
Klamath. First, the method of funding the Klamath removals differs
drastically from previously successful strategies for decommissioning the

499
500
501
502

See Schlosser, supra note 457, at 69.
Allen, supra note 409, at 465.
See Pope & Learn, supra note 482.
See Scott Learn, Salazar Can’t Sign Off on Removal of 4 Dams, OREGONIAN, Feb. 28, 2012,

at B1.
503 See Schlosser, supra note 457, at 45 (arguing that PacifiCorp’s “stakeholder benefits [from
the Hydroelectric Agreement] will result in a loss of certain ecosystem services and tribal rights
in the region”); Michael A. Swiger & Sharon L. White, Rebuttal in Defense of the Klamath
Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 297, 298 (2011) (defending the
Hydroelectric Agreement on behalf of PacifiCorp); Think Out Loud: Environmental Update, OR.
PUB. BROAD. (May 8, 2012), http://www.opb.org/thinkoutloud/shows/environmental-update-508
(discussing controversy over whether dam removal will lead to salmon restoration).
504 John Bowman, Klamath Dams: Hoopa Tribe Files Petition with FERC, SISKIYOU DAILY,
June 1, 2012, http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/article/20120601/NEWS/306019973/0 (last visited
Nov. 18, 2012). The Hoopa might be intending to force dam removal at PacifiCorp’s expense.
505 See supra Part II.
506 See supra Part III.
507 See supra Part IV.
508 See supra Part V.
509 See supra Part VI.A–B.
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Elwha and Condit Dams.510 The Klamath’s Hydroelectric Agreement placed
the primary fiscal responsibility for dam removal on the citizens who will
benefit most from a restored river ecosystem.511 Yet, by placing two state
electorates and two public utility bureaucracies in charge of securing $450
million, the Settlement Agreement has created a significant opportunity for
dam removal opponents to derail the project at the federal, state, or local
levels. Moreover, the parties to the Restoration and Hydroelectric
Agreements may have prolonged the process by tying the two agreements
together as a package deal awaiting approval from Congress.512 Congress
might have accommodated a dam removal proposal that required no
expenditures, but the current political atmosphere is unlikely to acquiesce to
the $400 million in additional appropriations contained in the Restoration
Agreement. The price tag of the Restoration Agreement and the branding
of the Klamath as the “largest dam removal project in history”513 seemed
to diverge from Congress’s reluctance to spend federal money on
infrastructure projects.514
Second, community support, or perhaps the lack of community
opposition, proved critical to the Elwha,515 Sandy,516 and Rogue River517 dam
removals. Pacifying the Klamath Basin population and uniting all of the
stakeholders around dam removal in the Klamath is highly unlikely, given
the century-old, multi-faceted conflict. The Klamath Agreements attempted
to generate a compromise acceptable to most parties; whether this approach
will prove successful remains to be seen. Currently, opponents of dam
removal, as well as some environmental groups critical of the agreements,518
have effectively blocked congressional approval and any progress toward
dam removal.
Third, in each of the previous dam removals in the Pacific Northwest, a
champion (a political figure, an agency, or an energy company) led the
movement toward dam removal.519 Perhaps as a symptom of the lack of
widespread support for the agreements, the Klamath lacks a champion
leading the campaign for dam removal and generating the political will to

510
511
512
513
514

See supra notes 108–12, 167–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 489–93 and accompanying text.
See Allen, supra note 409, at 451.
Id. at 427.
See, e.g., Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why This Is The Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST, July

13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is
-the-worst-congress-ever/ (“9. They can’t get appropriations done on time”) (last visited Nov. 18,
2012); Political Gridlock Rises, and the Debt Ceiling Doesn’t, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, July
2, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/07/02/137573479/political-gridlock-rises-and-the-debt-ceilingdoesnt?ps=cprs (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (discussing the unprecedented “debt ceiling” crisis
and the refusal of congressional Republicans to vote for tax or spending increases).
515 See supra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.
516 See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text.
517 See supra notes 309, 324, 350, 378 and accompanying text.
518 See Devoe, supra note 479 (noting WaterWatch, an Oregon environmental group, does not
support the Agreements).
519 See supra notes 109 (Elwha), 160 (White Salmon), 234 (Sandy), 297 (Rogue) and
accompanying text.
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see the project to completion.520 Although the dam removal movement
remains strong in the Klamath Basin,521 it is multi-dimensional, with many
competing interests and priorities, and no willing and capable leader to
garner and maintain the requisite political support from Congress, federal
agencies, PacifiCorp, the states, and the local community.
VII. CONCLUSION
From the successful restoration projects on the Elwha, White Salmon,
Sandy, and Rogue Rivers, to the proposed dam removals on the Klamath
River, this Article examined the experiences of dam decommissioning in the
Pacific Northwest. Several important factors, such as the size of the project,
the applicability of the FERC licensing process, the existence of local
opposition, the leadership of well-positioned politicians, and the availability
of funding, all affect the speed of the dam-removal process from proposal to
river restoration. The decades of struggles to remove dams in the Pacific
Northwest provide valuable lessons for other parts of the country and the
world hoping to follow in the Northwest’s footsteps in search of renewed
ecosystems and reclaimed rivers.522
The physical and human geography of the Pacific Northwest, including
a history of massive hydroelectric projects that depleted once-abundant
salmon fisheries, provided the impetus to remove the region’s dams.
Restoring fisheries also provides a significant motivation for removing dams
in the Snake River Basin of Idaho and Eastern Washington.523 Since the
1980s, river restoration advocates have called for the removal of four lower
Snake River hydroelectric dams that block salmon migration to thousands of
miles of headwaters spawning grounds.524 In May 2012, some members of the

520 See Editorial, On the Klamath, A Ship Is Sailing, OREGONIAN, Dec. 2, 2011, at B4 (noting
that U.S. Representative Greg Walden, who represents the Klamath Basin, has not fully
supported the Agreements because many of his constituents remain opposed to dam removal).
521

See id.

522

The movement to remove dams has an international component, including in Sweden.

See Anna G. C. Lejon et al., Conflicts Associated With Dam Removal in Sweden, ECOLOGY &
SOC’Y, Dec. 2009, available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/art4/ES-20092931.pdf.
523 See Am. Rivers, Lower Snake River, ID, OR and WA, http://www.americanrivers.org
/initiatives/dams/projects/lower-snake-river-id-or-wa.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) (“[B]est
available science concludes that removing [the four Snake River] dams and restoring a freeflowing lower Snake River would allow for the restoration of healthy, fishable salmon and
steelhead”). In addition to benefiting fish, dam removals boost local economies, increasing
recreational opportunities and improving public safety. See ECONOMIST, supra note 18, at 35.
524 See Scott Learn, Judge James Redden: “We Need to Take Those (Snake River) Dams
Down,” OREGONIAN, Apr. 25, 2012. See e.g. Michael C. Blumm et. al., Saving Snake River Water

and Salmon Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower
Snake River Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows,
28 ENVTL. L. 997, 1006–20 (1998) (providing an overview of reports and studies leading to the
calls for dam breaching).
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Nez Perce Tribe in Idaho renewed their calls for the federal government to
rethink its failed policies with respect to the Snake River.525
Other current dam removal proposals include the Green River in
Massachusetts526 and the Ventura River in California.527 In the future, dam
removal proposals are likely to accelerate.528 As the Harvard Law Review
recently observed, “[t]he Columbia River conflict is only the most highprofile manifestation of a growing unease about the environmental and
economic costs of dams: 241 dams were demolished nationwide between
2006 and 2010.”529 Current and future proposals for dam removal throughout
the country stand to benefit from the lessons of the Pacific Northwest.
The size of the dam and the amount of required restoration work are
major factors affecting the outcome of dam removal. Small-scale dams on
the Rogue River—the Gold Hill530 and Gold Ray Dams531—stood no more than
thirty-eight feet tall and were readily removed within a few years of the
initial proposal.532 On the other hand, the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams
each stood at least 105 feet tall with large reservoirs that will require years
of reclamation and deconstruction work to restore the river channel.533 For
more than two decades, the Elwha River dams’ size, complexity, and
symbolism represented a daunting task for both engineers and politicians,

525 See Brooklyn Baptiste, Balancing Power Needs and the Environment: What James
Redden Says on Salmon Recovery Still Matters, OREGONIAN, May 4, 2012, at C5 (“Supported by

concurring science extending back more than a decade, the [Nez Perce Tribe] has been a
leading advocate for breaching the lower Snake dams . . . .”). For a discussion of the role of
Judge Redden in efforts to restore Columbia Basin salmon through Endangered Species Act
compliance, see Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in Endangered
Species Act Litigation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32
Stan. Envtl. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2051638.
In August 2012, U.S. Representative Doc Hastings (R-WA) introduced House Bill 6247, the
Saving Our Dams and New Hydropower Development and Jobs Act of 2012, H.R. 6247, 112th
Cong. (2012), which would seriously undermine dam removal efforts on the Snake River and
nationwide. House Bill 6247 prohibits federal funding from being spent on removing, partially
removing, or even studying removal of any dam in the United States, and prevents federal funds
from being spent on dam removal mitigation or restoration after a dam has already been
removed. See H.R. 6247, 112th Cong. §§ 11–12 (2012).
526 U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, FINAL REPORT: SOMERSET & SEARSBURG DAMS (DEERFIELD RIVER
WATERSHED STUDY), at 36 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/water/
deerfield-report-2007.pdf.
527 See Ventura Cnty., Cal., Matilija Dam Ecosystem Restoration Project, http://www.
matilijadam.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
528 The environmental nonprofit group American Rivers has a stated goal of helping to
remove 100 obsolete dams in 2012. See Amy Souers Kober, American Rivers Blog, Help Us
Remove 100 Dams in 2012!, http://www.americanrivers.org/newsroom/blog/akober-201223-helpus-remove-100-dams-in-2012.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
529 Endangered Species Act—District of Oregon Invalidates Biological Opinion for
Federally Operated Dams on Columbia River—National Wildlife Federation v. National
Marine Fisheries Service, No. CV 01-00640-RE, 2011 WL 3322793 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2011), 125

HARV. L. REV. 819 (2012).
530 See supra Part V.A.2.
531 See supra Part V.A.3.
532 See supra notes 319, 329, 335 (Gold Hill) and 341, 349–55 (Gold Ray) and accompanying text.
533 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
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delaying the dam’s eventual removal.534 As of 2012, the Elwha dam removals
hold the record for the largest U.S. dam removal project in history535—a
record that many citizens and groups in the Klamath Basin hope to usurp.
The FERC licensing process for non-federal hydroelectric dams
presents either an opportunity for clarity or a cloud of uncertainty, but
exerts a considerable influence over the dam removal result. The Elwha,
White Salmon, and Sandy River dams all began the process of dam removal
because of the mandatory prescriptions for fish passage imposed by federal
agencies under the Federal Power Act.536 In the case of the Condit Dam,
PacifiCorp attempted to surrender its FERC license during the renewal
application, causing confusion at FERC, which had procedures for license
renewal or license surrender, but not both at the same time.537 PGE decided
from the outset to voluntarily surrender its FERC license for the Bull Run
Hydroelectric Project,538 and the James River Corporation avoided the FERC
process by transferring ownership of the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams to
the federal government.539
Local opposition to dam removal in the Pacific Northwest has proven to
be one of the most telling factors determining how much time passes
between initial proposal and completion of the project. Steadfast political
opposition, as demonstrated by Senator Gorton’s refusal to support the
Elwha Dam restoration,540 can obstruct the necessary congressional approval
and delay the project for years. In contrast, the remoteness and federal
ownership of the land surrounding the Sandy River dams meant that the dam
removal affected few local landowners, and thus the project proceeded
without significant opposition.541 Advocates for removing the Klamath River
dams have the most to learn from the Condit Dam removal, where local
landowners delayed the state and county permitting process and even
attempted to invoke environmental laws to derail the project.542 A
controversy as complex as the Klamath’s will not likely prompt unanimous
agreement, but persistent and coordinated efforts by federal agencies, tribes,
environmentalists, and the dam owners can eventually overcome even a
well-funded opposition.
Successful dam removals in the Pacific Northwest all exhibit the
presence of at least one strong political champion to provide leadership and
influence throughout the dam removal process. Congressmen John Dingell
and Norm Dicks and Senator Bill Bradley paved the way for Congress to

534
535

See supra Part II.B.1–3.
See Ker Than, Largest U.S. Dam Removal to Restore Salmon Runs, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC

NEWS, Aug. 31, 2011, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/08/110831-dam-removalelwha-freshwater-science-salmon (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
536 See supra notes 49–58 (Elwha), 159–63 (White Salmon), 224–31 (Sandy) and
accompanying text.
537 See supra notes 164, 170–71, 248–50 and accompanying text.
538 See supra notes 231–40 and accompanying text.
539 See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
540 See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
541 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
542 See supra notes 175–80 and accompanying text.
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approve the Elwha Act and fund the Elwha dam removals,543 and the
National Park Service fulfilled a leadership role in planning, permitting, and
conducting the restoration.544 The Yakama tribe and environmental groups
successfully campaigned to remove the Condit Dam by forcing a final
settlement agreement with PacifiCorp.545 On the Sandy River, the dam owner,
PGE, assumed a leadership role after perceiving an economic and public
relations gain through the speedy restoration of an immensely popular wild
fishery.546 Similarly, environmental groups and federal agencies led the way
for the Rogue River dam removals.547 However, the Klamath Basin currently
lacks an outspoken political champion.548
Finally, dam removals in the Pacific Northwest demonstrate that the
sources and amounts of funding determine whether a proposal for dam
decommissioning will proceed quickly or experience delay. Congressman
Dicks and others secured funding for the Elwha dam removals in stages,
allowing each appropriation to contribute small amounts that added up to
full funding over the course of a decade.549 The Elwha and Rogue dam
removals both benefited from the 2009 stimulus bill, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act, because they each had “shovel ready” plans in
place.550 Private funding from the dam owners financed the Condit551 and
Sandy River552 dam removals, although PacifiCorp operated the profitable
Condit Dam for six years under the settlement agreement in order to acquire
sufficient funds to pay for the $17 million restoration project.553
The projected costs for the Klamath River dam removals dwarf the final
bills from the Elwha,554 White Salmon,555 Sandy,556 and Rogue Rivers,557
especially because interest groups tied the dam removal proposal to the
water allocation agreement, which calls for a $400 million appropriation

543

See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
545 See supra notes 160, 167–71 and accompanying text.
546 See supra notes 234–40 and accompanying text.
547 See supra notes 292, 325–26 and accompanying text.
548 See supra note 520 and accompanying text.
549 See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
550 See supra notes 111, 349 and accompanying text; Charles Euchner, Lots of Stimulus
Money — and Concerns About Where to Put It to Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.
544

nytimes.com/2009/10/23/business/global/23rglobalus.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
551 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
552 See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
553 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
554 See supra notes 110 and accompanying text (Elwha dams removal cost between $246 and
$272 million).
555 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (Condit Dam removal costs capped at $17.15
million).
556 See supra notes 242–43 and accompanying text (the Sandy River dam removal cost about
$23.7 million).
557 See supra notes 308 (Savage Rapids cost about $28 million), 331 (Gold Hill cost about $4
million), 346 (Gold Ray cost about $5 million) and accompanying text. Total costs for notching
the Elk Creek Dam are unknown, but not likely to be significantly more than the removals at
Gold Hill or Gold Ray. Oregon Wild, supra note 356.
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from Congress.558 Advocates for the Klamath restoration and other future
dam removal proposals might consider following the example of the Elwha
dam removals by breaking the appropriations into smaller, more politically
palatable amounts.559 Although spreading the appropriations out into smaller
increments could extend the timeline for completing the project, a persistent
and measured approach may be the best option for funding larger-scale dam
removals in an era of fiscally strapped government budgets. Another option
would be to call upon PacifiCorp to commit more of the $510,000 it is
required to pay in salmon recovery efforts to help fund implementation of
the water allocation agreement, since that sum is just roughly 1.5 percent of
the annual revenues produced by the Klamath project.560
In the Pacific Northwest, the time between dam removal proposal and
completion ranged from only two years for the Gold Hill and Gold Ray Dams
to over twenty-nine years at the Condit Dam.561 On average, the campaigns to
successfully remove nine dams in the region lasted about thirteen years.
Advocates for current and future dam removal proposals should be prepared
for a project that faces significant odds and may take over a decade to
complete, depending on the dam’s size, FERC licensing process, community
support, political leadership, and funding available for removal.

558
559
560
561

See supra notes 505–14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying and following note 500.
See supra notes 72, 94–112 (Elwha, 25 years); 160–61, 164–190 (Condit, 29 years); 237–57

(Sandy, 7 years); 279–314 (Savage Rapids, 15 years); 331–35 (Gold Hill, 2 years); 341–55 (Gold
Ray, 2 years); 379–94 (Elk Creek, 15 years).
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